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Abstract: This report analyzes the export performance of the Mexican agricultural and food 
sector in recent years with a particular emphasis on the changing competitiveness of those 
exports in the U.S. and world markets.  The report includes an examination of the general trends 
in Mexican agricultural and food exports, an analysis of the international competitiveness of the 
major subgroups of Mexican agriculture based on the Revealed Comparative Advantage 
methodology, an assessment of the competitiveness of Mexican exports of specific agricultural 
and food products to the United States, a consideration of the effectiveness of Mexico’s 
agricultural and food export market diversification efforts, a discussion of the main factors likely 
to affect the long-term competitiveness of Mexican agriculture, and policy recommendations for 
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This report analyzes the export performance of the Mexican agricultural and food sector in recent 
years with a particular emphasis on the changing competitiveness of Mexican agricultural and 
food exports in the U.S. and world markets. The report begins with an examination of general 
trends in Mexican agricultural exports and then continues with an analysis of the international 
competitiveness of the major subgroups of Mexican agriculture based on the Revealed 
Comparative Advantage methodology.  The focus then turns to an assessment of the 
competitiveness of Mexican exports of specific agricultural and food products to the United 
States, Mexico’s principal export market, followed by a consideration of the effectiveness of 
Mexico’s agricultural export market diversification efforts. Following a discussion of the main 
factors likely to affect the long-term competitiveness of Mexican agriculture, the main 
conclusions of this report are summarized and policy recommendations for enhancing the 
competitiveness of Mexican agricultural and food exports are offered. 
 
Despite growth in the absolute value of Mexican agricultural and food exports since the mid-
1980s, the report concludes that the share of total Mexican exports accounted for by agricultural 
and food products is declining.  A Revealed Comparative Analysis (RCA) of Mexican 
agricultural and food exports confirms that Mexico does not have a clear comparative advantage 
in the production and export of agricultural and food products in general. When the RCA 
analysis is performed at the commodity subgroup level, however, the results suggest that Mexico 
may have a clear comparative advantage in vegetables and fruits but not in other major export 
categories like animals and animal products or processed food. While Mexico’s comparative 
disadvantage in animal products appears to be growing, its comparative advantage in vegetables 
has been eroding over the last decade.  Mexican fruit exports appear to be maintaining their 
comparative advantage level while the dynamic processed food sector appears to be gaining 
comparative advantage as indicated by a doubling of their RCA index since 1995. 
 
U.S. imports of most agricultural and food products have been increasing since the early 1990s. 
Not surprisingly, the U.S. currently accounts for 86% of the value of all Mexican agricultural and 
food exports.  Although growing in absolute value, however, Mexican vegetable exports to the 
U.S. have been losing their share of total U.S. vegetable imports over the last two decades 
despite the implementation of NAFTA in 1994. The story for livestock and livestock products is 
similar. On the other hand, the Mexican share of U.S. fruit imports is growing but at a slower 
rate than is the case for processed foods which doubled their share of U.S. imports of those 
products since 1995, reaching almost 18% of total U.S. imports. 
 
Also, with few exceptions, the share of U.S. imports accounted for by the top 24 individual 
Mexican agricultural and food exports has been declining especially in recent years.  These are 
the commodities where investments to increase the levels of productivity and efficiency in 
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production, marketing, and transportation and to eliminate institutional, administrative, and 
political barriers to trade would have the highest payoff for Mexico.  The clear exceptions to this 
case are avocados and malt beverages (beer) which continue to experience market share gains in 
continuously growing U.S. import markets. While some Mexican exports like tomatoes and 
peppers have shown some capacity to recover from market share erosions, other products like 
non-malt beverages and grapes have allowed early market share gains to turn into heavy market 
share losses in recent years. Some Mexican exports that have been growing in absolute value like 
asparagus, mangoes, melons, cauliflower/broccoli, eggplants, and cucumbers have experienced 
almost continual losses in their shares of U.S. imports. On the other hand, traditional Mexican 
export products like bananas, coffee, and live cattle have been losing share in markets where 
U.S. imports have been declining as well. 
 
In the only other major markets for Mexican exports, the European Union (EU) and Canada, the 
consistently competitive Mexican products have been beer and to a lesser extent avocados, 
tomatoes, peppers, and grapes.  The Mexican shares of EU and Canadian imports of most other 
Mexican agricultural food exports have been declining.  In contrast, Mexico’s share of Japanese 
agricultural and food imports has been increasing over the last decade reaching a high of just 
over 1% in 2004.  Mexico accounts for 2% of Japanese fruit and vegetable imports, nearly 3% of 
Japanese meat imports (mainly pork), and over 8% of Japanese alcoholic beverage imports. 
 
The growing liberalization of world agricultural and food markets may contribute to further 
erosion of Mexican export competitiveness in its major markets in favor of new suppliers 
(particularly Central and South America).  A number of other factors that have the potential to 
affect the long-run competitiveness of Mexican agricultural exports are analyzed in the report. 
Among them, none have received more U.S. media and policy attention than food safety (FS) 
and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) issues related to imported Mexican agricultural and food 
products.  The actual impact of those issues on Mexican export competitiveness is likely much 
smaller than the attention they receive however. In terms of FS issues, strawberries, cantaloupes, 
and green onions have generated most of the attention since the mid-1990s.  Despite efforts of 
Mexican producers, shippers, and government agencies to resolve the problems and mitigate the 
economic effects of outbreaks of foodborne illnesses in the U.S. caused by imported Mexican 
produce, the food safety scares created by the outbreaks have caused significant economic 
damage to Mexican exporters independent of their involvement in any particular case of food 
contamination.  Because these three products represent less than 3% of the total annual value of 
Mexican agricultural exports to the U.S., however, the FS issue poses a relatively low level of 
threat to the current and future competitiveness of Mexican agricultural and food exports.  The 
situation is similar for SPS problems where avocados and oranges have received much of the 
attention.  Again, however, avocados and oranges represent around only 2% of the value of 
Mexican agricultural exports to the U.S.  From an animal health perspective, cattle tuberculosis 
appears to have been the most prevalent SPS problem affecting Mexican exports to the U.S. 
 
Four other factors were also found to pose medium to high limitations to the current and  future 
export competitiveness of the top 24 Mexican agricultural and food exports to the U.S.: (1) 
problems in the distribution and availability of water in Mexico; (2) an underdeveloped 
transportation infrastructure; (3) underinvestment in the development, diffusion, and adoption of 
new technology; and (4) the potential growth in Mexican incomes as economic development  
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proceeds.  The first three factors imply particular limitations for growth of the Mexican fruit and 
vegetable industry, less so perhaps for tomatoes but particularly for other vegetables that tend to 
be residual claimants of water and are more likely to be grown in the eastern and central regions 
of Mexico on small and medium farms.  The growth of income in Mexico becomes a limit to 
Mexico’s ability to export if the consequent growth in domestic demand limits the availability of 
domestic production for export.  This outcome is more likely to be the case if the limitations 
imposed by the other three factors effectively prohibit domestic supply from expanding 
sufficiently to meet any domestic growth in demand. 
 
The most effective strategy for Mexico to further enhance its agricultural and food export 
competitiveness is to focus on removing internal constraints.  While some specific export 
promotion efforts will need to be included in the policy mix, the key component of any 
successful strategy to enhance Mexican agricultural and food export competitiveness must be a 
substantial increase in public investments in several critical areas, including the expansion of 
irrigation water supplies and delivery systems, transportation infrastructure, and technology 
development, diffusion, and adoption.  Of course, the public investment required to successfully 
relieve these constraints could be enormous.  Nevertheless, such investments are critically 
needed if any real improvement in export competitiveness is to be achieved. 
 
At a minimum, a successful strategy to achieve a substantial and sustained expansion of Mexican 
agricultural and food exports will need to  incorporate at least some features of the following 
policy alternatives at some level of investment (in no particular order): (1) targeted export 
promotion to diversify and expand Mexican export markets particularly for products that have 
found niches in overseas markets (such as beer, avocadoes, mangoes, guava, peppers, dried 
legumes, and possibly grapes) and possibly products currently experiencing a downward trend in 
their share of growing U.S. imports (such as cucumbers, asparagus, broccoli, squash, 
strawberries, eggplant, and cut flowers); (2) production conversion assistance, including 
programs designed to encourage acreage currently devoted to export crops that are losing shares 
of declining U.S. imports (such as  coffee, sugar, bananas, and melons) to be converted to the 
production of commodities whose shares of growing U.S. imports are growing (such as 
tomatoes, peppers, avocadoes, onions, pecans, citrus, and other fruits, vegetables, and nuts); (3) 
increased public investments in irrigation water storage and delivery systems, particularly in the  
eastern and central regions of Mexico characterized by a large number of small farms with 
limited access to resources to expand production; (4) increased public investments in trade-
related transportation infrastructure; (5) increased public investments in agricultural research to 
boost agricultural production efficiency and reduce production costs and to adapt and 
commercialize  technologies available in other countries for use in Mexico; (6) the establishment 
of an effective system for technology and information diffusion, including training programs for 
ejidatarios and agribusiness owners and re-training programs  for agricultural labor displaced by 
growing agricultural imports; (7) an enhanced market intelligence system to support informed 
and efficient decision-making in the Mexican agriculture and agribusiness sectors; and (8) 
additional resources to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of SENASICA, the Mexican 
government agency responsible for both food safety and sanitary/phytosanitary programs.   
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Before the mid-1980s, Mexico was one of the most closed economies of the world with import 
tariffs of 100% and higher on many products as part of an overall economic development 
strategy of import substitution.  Mounting external debt, a sharp devaluation of the Mexican 
Peso, and the ensuing economic crisis of the early 1980s, however, forced Mexico to abandon 
import substitution and institute an historic process of sweeping economic reforms. 
 
As one part of that adjustment, Mexico acceded to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in 1986.  As a condition of GATT membership, Mexico agreed to reduce its average 
import tariff level from around 80% to about 50% (Williams 2001).  In the agricultural sector, 
Mexico went much further than required, unilaterally reducing the average tariff level to between 
10% and 20% much before the implementation of NAFTA in 1994.  Mexico also unilaterally 
eliminated the import licensing requirement for most agricultural products.  In addition, Mexico 
initiated the privatization of the many government-owned enterprises through a process of 
mergers, liquidation, and sales, reduced the growth rate of the money supply in an attempt to 
curb inflation, brought the peso more in line with the U.S. dollar through foreign exchange 
operations, and forced the Mexican farm sector towards greater market determination of prices, 
production, and marketing by eliminating the producer price support program as well as 
subsidies for all agricultural production inputs, including credit, fertilizer, electricity, irrigation, 
and water (Grennes, et al. 1991). 
 
The dramatic turnaround in Mexican trade policy and the accompanying Mexican economic 
reforms generated an impressive surge in Mexican trade in both agricultural and non-agricultural 
products over the last two decades linking the performance of the overall Mexican economy, and 
the agricultural sector in particular, closely to its competitiveness in world markets. Of particular 
importance to Mexican agricultural export performance is the competitiveness of those exports in 
U.S. markets.  Spurred by the signing of NAFTA and benefiting from geographic proximity, the 
U.S. has become Mexico’s primary agricultural export market, accounting for over 86% of 
Mexican agricultural exports in 2004 (USDAa).  Following the implementation of NAFTA, 
however, Mexico aggressively sought to diversify its export markets through bilateral trade 
agreements, signing 11 other free trade agreements since NAFTA was implemented with 18 
countries and the European Union. 
 
This report analyzes the export performance of the Mexican agricultural sector in recent years 
with a particular emphasis on the changing competitiveness of Mexican agricultural exports in 
the U.S. and world markets.  The analysis begins with an examination of the general trends in 
Mexican agricultural exports and then continues with an analysis of the international 
competitiveness of the major subgroups of Mexican agriculture based on the Revealed 
Comparative Advantage methodology developed by Balassa (1965).  The focus then turns to an 
assessment of the competitiveness of Mexican exports of specific agricultural and food products 
to the United States, Mexico’s principal export market followed by a consideration of the  
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effectiveness of Mexico’s agricultural export market diversification efforts. Following a 
discussion of the main factors likely to affect the long-term competitiveness of Mexican 
agriculture, the main conclusions of this report are summarized and policy recommendations for 
enhancing the competitiveness of Mexican agricultural and food exports are offered. 
 
 




After the unilateral opening of Mexican markets began in 1985, Mexican exports of agricultural 
and non-agricultural products increased rapidly even before the implementation of NAFTA in 
1994.  In the five years prior to NAFTA, Mexican exports of all products increased by over 72% 
from $US 35.2 billion in 1989 to $US 60.6 billion in 1994, an annual average increase of $US 
5.1 billion (Figure 1).  Over that same period, Mexican agricultural exports grew by over 48% 
from $US 3.0 billion to $US 4.5 billion, an annual average increase of $US 290.4 million (Figure 
2).  In contrast, Mexican exports of petroleum declined by nearly 6.5% over that period while 
exports of all other non-agricultural products grew by over 100%, more than double the rate of 
growth in agricultural exports (Figure 2). 
 
In the five years following the implementation of NAFTA, the annual rate of growth in Mexican 
exports of both agricultural and non-agricultural goods increased substantially.  Between 1994 
and 1999, total Mexican exports grew by an annual average of $US 15.1 billion, 3 times the rate 
in the previous five years before NAFTA.  Over the same period, Mexican agricultural exports 
increased by nearly 71%, an average annual increase of  $US 632 million, more than double the 
annual rate of increase in the 5 years before NAFTA (Figure 2).  At the same time, Mexican 
exports of both petroleum and other non-petroleum exports both registered substantial increases 
as well.  In the most recent period of 1999 to 2004, agricultural and other non-petroleum exports 
continued to increase but at substantially lower rates (38% and 30%, respectively) while the rate 
of growth in petroleum exports continued to increase (Figure 2). 
 
 Despite the almost continual growth in the level of Mexican agricultural exports since 1985, 
petroleum and other non-agricultural exports have tended to grow even more rapidly resulting in 
an almost continual decline in the share of total Mexican exports accounted for by agriculture 
from over 8% in the pre-NAFTA years to 5.6% in 2004 (Figure 3).  The declining agricultural 
share of Mexican exports since the 1980s has coincided with a declining agricultural share of 
national GDP and a declining share of the Mexican agricultural GDP accounted for by exports 
over the same period (Figure 4).  Liberalization of Mexican markets and economic reforms in the 
                                                 
1  Trade data in this section were obtained from the UN Commodity Trade Statistics (COMTRADE) database   
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/) under the SITC Rev. 3 classification.  “Agricultural” trade was defined 
using the trade data for the following commodity codes: 0   (Food and Live animals after subtracting out 
commodity code 03 for Fish/Shellfish/etc.); 1 (Beverages and Tobacco); 21 (Hides/Skins/Fur, Raw); 22 
(Oilseeds/Oil Fruits);  261 (Silk); 263 (Cotton); 264 (Jute and Other Textile Fibers); 265 (Other Vegetable Textile 
Fibers); 268 (Wool/Animal Hair); 29 (Crude Animal/Vegetable Matter NES); and 4 (Animal/ Vegetable 
Oils/Fats).  Other data were obtained from the Bank of Mexico, the Mexican National Institute for Statistics, 
Geography and Information (INEGI), and the U.S. Trade Internet System maintained by the Foreign Agriculture 
Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
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pre-NAFTA years boosted agricultural GDP by nearly 76% from $US 13.3 billion in 1988 to 
$US 23.3 billion in 1993 (Figure 4).  Even so, the agricultural share of Mexican GDP declined 
from 7.3% to 5.8% over the same pre-NAFTA period as growth primarily in the non-petroleum 
industrial sector outstripped the growth in the agricultural sector.  Even as the agricultural share 
of Mexican GDP declined during that pre-NAFTA period, the Mexican agricultural sector 
became less dependent on agricultural exports as the export share of the agricultural GDP 
declined from 19% in 1989 to 12.9% in 1993 (Figure 4).  
 
In late 1994 and early 1995, the Mexican Peso devaluation and the ensuing economic crisis 
dropped Mexican agricultural GDP (in US$) by nearly 40% between 1993 and 1995, back to pre-
liberalization levels (Figure 4).  At the same time, however, the Peso devaluation removed the 
implicit export tax of the previously overvalued Peso and led to a 45% jump in Mexican 
agricultural exports between 1994 and 1995 (see Figure 3) and greater dependence of the 
agricultural sector on exports once again. The export share of Mexican agricultural GDP 
temporarily rebounded from the 1993 low of 12.9% to a high of 21% in 1994 (Figure 4).  The 
recovery of the Mexican economy since 1995, however, returned both the Mexican agricultural 
GDP and the export share of the Mexican agricultural GDP back to their pre-crisis levels of 
about $US 23 billion and 13%, respectively, by 2001 while the agricultural share of Mexican 
GDP continued sliding to a low of 3.5% by 2003 (Figure 4). 
 
Since the early days of Mexican trade liberalization in the mid-1980s, the United States has been 
the primary destination for Mexican agricultural exports.  From just over $US 1 billion in the 
early 1980s, Mexican exports to the United States have grown almost continually, reaching $US 
9.1 billion and accounting for over 86% of all Mexican agricultural exports in 2004 (Figure 5).  
The average annual rate of growth in Mexican agricultural exports to the United States jumped 
substantially after the implementation of NAFTA from $US 233.6 million between 1989 and 
1994 to nearly $US 530 million between 1994 and 2004.  Despite the rapid growth in U.S. 
agricultural imports from Mexico, the U.S. share of Mexican agricultural exports has remained 
fairly stable at between about 80% and 90% over the years despite Mexico’s efforts to expand its 
export customer base (Figure 6). 
 
While the European Union (EU) has been the only other major market for Mexican agricultural 
exports over the years, the EU share of Mexican agricultural exports has been declining from 
about 6.5% in the years just before the implementation of NAFTA to only 3.7% in 2004 (Figure 
7).  In contrast, Mexican agricultural exports to Canada have been growing steadily from only 
$US 7.1 million in 1989 (0.2% of Mexican agricultural exports) to just over $US 130 million in 
2004 (1.3% of Mexican agricultural exports).  Other minor markets for Mexican agricultural 
exports, individually accounting for 1% or less of those exports, include various countries in 
Central and South America and Asia.  
 
For most countries other than the United States, the agricultural share of total Mexican exports 
has been increasing.  In 1989, agricultural goods accounted for 16% of Mexican exports to the 
United States but only 5.4% in 2004 (Figure 8).  In contrast, the agricultural share of Mexican 
exports to Canada increased from 2.6% in 1989 to 4.8% in 2004.  The agricultural share of 
Mexican exports to the European Union has fluctuated considerably, increasing from 7.2% in 
1989 to 15.7% in 1997 and then back down to 5.9% in 2004.  Mexican exports to other countries  
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have also been increasingly composed of agricultural goods.  The agriculture share of Mexico’s 
exports to those other countries increased from just over 1% in 1989 to nearly 8% in 2004. 
 
 
Measuring Mexican Agricultural and Food Export Competitiveness 
 
 
This section of the report provides an analysis of the export competitiveness of Mexican 
agriculture in general and for four major subgroups of Mexican agricultural and food exports 
using the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) measure developed by Balassa (1965).  The 
analysis then turns to a consideration of the competitiveness of the four major agricultural 
subgroups of Mexican agricultural and food exports in U.S. markets.  Finally, attention is 
focused on the competitiveness of those exports outside the United States as Mexico has 
attempted to diversify its agricultural and food export markets 
 
 
Revealed Comparative Advantage of Mexican Agriculture 
 
 
The Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) measure developed by Balassa (1965) is based on 
the notion that even though the theoretical comparative advantage of a country cannot be directly 
measured since relative prices in autarky are not observable, a country’s observable pattern of 
trade “reveals” its comparative advantage.  Thus, observable trade data can be used to infer a 
country’s comparative advantage.  Balassa’s RCA measure has been widely used to analyze 
comparative advantage primarily because it is relatively simple to calculate and explain.   
Balassa’s RCA measure is calculated as the ratio of a country’s export share of world trade in a 
specific commodity or group of commodities to its overall contribution to world trade. As 
applied in this analysis, Balassa’s index is calculated as: 
 
(1) (Xmk/Xwk)/(Xma /Xwa) 
 
where, for a given year, X represents exports; m is for Mexico; k is the commodity of interest (in 
this case, all agricultural and food exports or one of the four major subgroups of Mexican 
agricultural and food exports); w is the world; and a is all agricultural and non-agricultural 
goods.   
 
An RCA greater than 1 indicates that Mexico’s share of world exports of the commodity of 
interest is greater than its share of world exports of all goods and, thus, Mexico’s trade would 
“reveal” a comparative advantage in the export of that particular commodity.  On the other hand, 
an RCA of less than 1 indicates that Mexico’s share of world exports of the commodity of 
interest is less than its share of world exports of all goods implying that Mexico’s trade “reveals” 
a comparative disadvantage in the export of that commodity. 
 
Applying the index to all Mexican agricultural exports (where k is the total value of Mexican 
agricultural and food exports as defined earlier) using the U.N. COMTRADE data, the calculated 
RCA suggests that as Mexico was unilaterally opening its markets in the pre-NAFTA years the  
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country was losing its comparative advantage in agriculture as the RCA declined from almost 2.5 
in 1989 to 0.7 in 1992 (Figure 9).  However, caution should be used in interpreting this result in 
this way since the number of countries included in the COMTRADE data used in this analysis 
after 1991 was different than the number included before 1991.  Nevertheless, the result is 
consistent with the fact that Mexico began removing the high level of support provided to its 
agricultural sector in the mid-1980s and early 1990s through trade liberalization and dramatic 
changes in domestic support policy, removing the restrictions on imports and the incentives to 
produce and export.  In any case, since 1992, the Mexican RCA has fluctuated only slightly 
between about 0.7 and 0.8 implying that Mexico has a comparative disadvantage in agriculture in 
general.  Interestingly, the RCA for Mexican agricultural exports climbed slightly between 2002 
and 2004 suggesting some improvement in competitiveness.  A few more years of data will be 
needed to determine if the upward movement is the start of a long-run trend or simply a 
statistical anomaly.  
 
Primary Mexican agricultural and food exports include: (1) vegetables (fresh, chilled, and 
frozen); (2) fruit (fresh, chilled, frozen); (3) animal products (livestock, meat, livestock products, 
and dairy products); and (4) processed food (processed consumer oriented products, normally 
differentiated or branded, including malt and spirit beverages, processed and preserved fruits and 
vegetables, fruit juices, bakery products, and confectionary products). Calculation of the RCA 
index for each of these four groups suggests that Mexico has a clear comparative advantage in 
vegetables with an RCA in excess of 4 in all years and in fruits with an RCA in excess of 1 in all 
years (Figure 10).  Between 1991 and 2002, the RCA for both groups trended downward from 
6.8 to 4.4 for fruits and from 3.1 to 1.5 for vegetables.  Between 2002 and 2004, however, 
increases in the RCAs for both groups suggest a possible reversal to the long-run downward 
trends.  
 
The calculated RCAs for animal products and processed foods, on the other hand, clearly 
indicate a comparative disadvantage in Mexican production and export of both groups of 
commodities but also steady improvement in competitiveness of both groups since the lows of 
the early to mid-1990s (Figure 10). The relatively stronger improvement in the competitiveness 
of the processed foods group is likely due to the strong export performance of Mexican malted 
beverages (beer).  If the trend continues, the RCA for this group could increase to over 1 
suggesting that Mexico has gained a comparative advantage in processed food exports.  
 
In summary, the analysis suggests that Mexico has a strong comparative advantage in fresh 
vegetables and relatively weaker advantage in fresh fruits with the competitiveness of each 
declining slightly during the 1990s and some recovery in recent years. Also, while the RCA 
calculation suggests that Mexico does not have a comparative advantage in either animal or 
processed food products, the latter group shows a dynamic growth in competitiveness moving 




The Competitiveness of Mexican Agricultural and Food Exports in the United States 
 
 
As discussed earlier, the U.S. is the major market for Mexican agricultural and food products, 
currently accounting for about 86% of all Mexican agricultural exports (USDAa).  That the U.S. 
is such a dominant customer for Mexican agricultural and food products should not be surprising 
since Mexico has several advantages over its export competitors in access to U.S. markets.  Of 
course, no other country except Canada is closer to major U.S. food consumption centers. Just as 
important, however, is that a growing U.S. population of Mexican origin along with economic 
and cultural integration is rapidly introducing Mexican foods and cuisine to a large non-Hispanic 
population.  At the same time, NAFTA has provided a clear trade policy advantage to Mexico in 
access to U.S. markets. 
 
The future viability and profitability of the Mexican agricultural sector will depend largely on the 
extent to which Mexico is able to defend its share of U.S. markets as the U.S. enters into its own 
set of bilateral trade agreements and as the Doha Round of trade negotiations results in further 
multilateral liberalization of trade.  Consequently, the trends in the Mexican share of U.S. 
imports of agricultural and food products are calculated and analyzed as indicators of the 
competitiveness of Mexican exports in U.S. markets.   
 
First, changes over time in the Mexican shares of U.S. imports of the four major commodity 
groups defined earlier are examined
2.  Then changes in the Mexican shares of the U.S. market 
for 24 of the top individual commodities Mexico exports to the United States are examined.  The 
24 commodities selected account for 85% of the value of all Mexican agricultural exports to the 
United States. In 2004, the processed food products group represented almost 38% of the total 
value of Mexican agricultural and food exports to the U.S. overtaking vegetables, traditionally 
the largest Mexican export category to the U.S. by value, at 35%.   The fruits and animal and 
products categories accounted for 15% and 10%, respectively, of Mexican agricultural and food 
exports to the U.S. in 2004. 
 
Despite an almost continual increase in the value of Mexican exports of vegetables to the United 
States since pre-NAFTA years, Mexico’s share of all U.S. imports of vegetables has declined 
almost continually to 55% in 2004 after reaching a high of 75% in 1990 (Figure 11).  The decline 
in the Mexican share of U.S. vegetable imports since 1990 may be due in large part to two recent 
market phenomena.  First, competition for Mexican vegetable exports to the United States from 
Canadian and European exports of vegetables grown in greenhouses (particularly tomatoes and 
bell peppers) has grown dramatically in the last 5 years or so (Cook and Calvin 2005).  Also, the 
opening of the U.S. market to imports from Central and South America through bilateral 
preferential trade treatments (Caribbean Basin and Andean initiatives) has created growing 
competition in U.S. markets for Mexican vegetables, particularly asparagus, melons, and 
broccoli/cauliflower.  
 
The Mexican share of all U.S. imports of processed foods doubled between 1990 and 2004 from 
9% to 18% (Figure 11).  This steady and impressive growth trend is closely related to the strong 
                                                 
2   The market shares are calculated using FATUS data from the Foreign Agriculture Service, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDAa).   
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export performance of Mexican beer in U.S. markets but also to increases in Mexican exports of 
other beverages, processed vegetables, and bakery and confectionary products to the United 
States.  
 
The Mexican export share of U.S. fruit imports has also grown rapidly over time, jumping from 
14% in 1990 to a high of 25% in 1999 before sliding back to 20% in 2000 followed by  gradual 
growth back to 23.7% in 2004 (Figure 11).  The growth in the Mexican share of U.S. fruit 
imports has been the result of a surge in Mexican grape and avocado exports to the U.S. 
associated with the lifting of some U.S. phytosanitary barriers. 
 
After registering a steady increase between 1989 and 1995 from 6% to 10%, the Mexican share 
of U.S. animal and animal products imports dropped sharply to 2.8% during the height of the 
Mexican economic recession in 1996 and then recovered slowly in the post-recession years back 
to a little over 5% in 2000 (Figure 11).  A recent increase in the Mexican market share back to 
about 6.5% in 2004 was mainly due to the U.S. ban on imports of Canadian cattle.  Nevertheless, 
the generally downward trend in the Mexican share of U.S. animal and animal product imports is 
related to the stagnant trend in U.S. per capita beef consumption and increasing U.S. imports of 
fed cattle from Canada and of meat products from several other countries, including New 
Zealand, Brazil, and Argentina.   
 
This analysis of the Mexican shares of U.S. agricultural and food imports, however, only tells 
part of the story of Mexican exports to the United States. A successful international business 
strategy calls for the positioning of a product in a growing market. Achieving an increasing share 
of a declining import market is not a formula for long-term export growth and competitiveness. 
On the other hand, achieving growing shares of foreign growth markets is the basis for not only 
the long-term growth of a country’s exports but also for the economic viability and welfare of the 
country’s export-dependent industries.  At the same time, a growing export share of a growing 
foreign import market suggests gains in the competitiveness of a country’s exports not only in 
relation to those of its export competitors but also in relation to domestic producers in the 
importing country. 
 
Changing consumer preferences have led the way to profitable and expanding food markets in 
developed countries. In recent years, demographic changes, health concerns, evolving 
convenience and variety requirements, and changing marketing strategies by food service 
providers and retailers in the U.S. are inducing important adjustments in consumer food 
demands.  U.S. per capita consumption of some traditional products is declining and is rapidly 
expanding in others.  As a consequence, U.S. agricultural and food markets are under growing 
internal and external pressure for market access by foreign exporters through trade agreement 
arrangements and aggressive marketing strategies.   
 
To gain some insight on the implications of the changing Mexican shares of U.S. agricultural and 
food imports for the Mexican export potential over the long run and what that may mean for the 
development of Mexican agriculture over time, changes in those shares since 1989 for the 24 top 
Mexican agricultural exports to the U.S. are compared to the growth of U.S. imports of those 
same commodities. The analysis considers three time periods:  (1) the pre-NAFTA period of 
1989 to 1994, (2) the early stage of NAFTA from 1994 to 1999 during which most U.S. tariffs  
8 
on Mexican agricultural and food products were eliminated and during which Mexico began 
signing free trade agreements with other countries, and (3)  the second stage of NAFTA from 
1999 through 2004 during which the U.S. began to provide other countries with increased access 
to U.S. markets through negotiating bilateral free trade agreements with those countries. 
 
The results are illustrated in Figure 12.  The upper right quadrant of Figure 12 includes 
commodities with positive Mexican share changes and positive U.S. import growth during each 
of the three periods.  These are the commodities for which Mexico gained a larger share of a 
growing market in the indicated time period.  The upper left quadrant of Figure 12 includes 
commodities with negative Mexican share changes but positive U.S. import growth during each 
of the three periods. These are the commodities for which Mexico was losing share of growing 
U.S. imports. The bottom right quadrant of Figure 12 includes commodities with positive 
Mexican share changes but negative U.S. import growth during each of the three periods. These 
are commodities for which Mexico gained a larger share of declining U.S. imports. Finally, the 
bottom left quadrant of Figure 12 includes commodities with negative Mexican share changes 
and negative U.S. import growth during each of the three periods. These are the commodities for 
which Mexico was losing share of declining U.S. imports. 
 
From a long-run strategic point of view, the optimal scenario for Mexico would be for all 
commodities, particularly in recent years (the triangles  in Figure 12), to be in the top right 
quadrant.  For these commodities, continuing investments to increase the levels of productivity 
and efficiency in production, marketing, and transportation and to eliminate institutional, 
administrative, and political barriers to trade are required to maintain market share and realize 
the long-run export potential.  The long-run strategic implications of commodities being in any 
other quadrant are negative for the Mexican agricultural export industry.  For commodities in the 
top left quadrant, Mexico is losing market share of U.S. growth markets to other countries.   
These are the commodities where investments to increase productivity and efficiency and to 
eliminate remaining barriers to trade could have the highest payoff for Mexico.  For commodities 
in the bottom right quadrant, Mexico is gaining share of declining U.S. markets suggesting a 
need to shift resources out of the production of those commodities into those in the top right 
quadrant. For those commodities in the bottom left quadrant, Mexico is losing market share in a 
declining U.S. import market.  These may be commodities where profitability signals have 
already begun shifting resources to other more profitable alternatives for export to the United 
States.  They are also the commodities where investments in increased efficiency and 
productivity would have the lowest payoff. 
 
Figure 12 illustrates clearly that for most of its top agricultural and food exports to the United 
States, Mexico is exporting into growth markets. In recent years, Mexico has been gaining 
market share of growing U.S. imports of avocados, citrus, malt beverages (beer), onions, and 
pecans. For most other commodities in most time periods, however, Mexico has lost market 
share of growing U.S. markets (Figure 12).  In recent years, Mexico has been losing market share 
of growing U.S. imports of grapes, eggplant, strawberries, cauliflower/broccoli, other beverages, 
squash, and cut flowers. 
 
Mexican tomatoes, the top Mexican agricultural export to the United States, lost market share of 
growing U.S. imports in the pre-NAFTA years but experienced an even greater loss of market  
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share in the years immediately following the implementation of NAFTA (Figure 12).  In recent 
years, Mexico has rebounded and has held its own in the U.S. tomato market against it export 
competitors.  Commodities for which Mexico has lost market share of declining U.S. imports in 
recent years include coffee, sugar, bananas, and melons. 
 
Table 1 highlights the detailed results for each of the top 24 commodities that Mexico exports to 
the United States. The last three columns show that of those 24 commodities, total U.S. imports 
from all sources experienced a decline in only 5 cases in the most recent period of 1999-2004, 
including coffee, bananas, melons, sugar, and cattle.  The first three columns show that most of 
Mexico’s top agricultural and food exports lost shares of U.S. imports of those commodities in 
the recent period of 1999-2004.  Along with Figure 12, Table 1 serves to demonstrate that 
changes in export value or market share alone are unreliable indicators of the competitiveness of 
a country’s exports. 
 
For example, note that while Mexican exports of cucumbers, mangoes, asparagus, and 
cauliflower/broccoli to the United States have all been growing in recent years, Mexico has been 
losing U.S. import share of each rather consistently over time. In the case of Mexican exports of 
tomatoes, peppers, and onions to the United States, all of which have also been growing 
consistently over the years, Mexico has been able to prevent a further erosion of its market share. 
Mexican tomato exports, for example, were losing market share to Canadian greenhouse-
produced tomatoes until 2000 when the Mexican tomato industry began adopting similar 
technologies and recapturing some of its lost market (Cook and Calvin 2005). The opposite is the 
case for Mexican exports of grapes and “other beverages” both of which experienced impressive 
growth in the pre-NAFTA years and in the immediate post-NAFTA years.  Despite continued 
strong growth in U.S. imports of both grapes and “other beverages” in recent years, however, the 
Mexican shares of those growing U.S. imports have eroded substantially. Squash, melons, 
strawberries, eggplant, and cut flowers are also showing signs of losing their competitive 
advantage. 
 
The success stories of Mexican competitiveness in agricultural exports to U.S. markets are 
clearly avocados and malt beverages.  Mexico’s growing share of U.S. beer imports has been at 
the expense primarily of Canadian and European beers.  The poorest Mexican export performers 
are coffee, bananas, cattle, sugar, grapes, asparagus, melons, and mangoes, each of which 
experienced sizable U.S. import share loses between 1999 and 2004.  Mexican asparagus, 
mangoes, bananas, and grapes have all lost U.S. import shares to South American exporters 
(Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil). Mexican melons, cauliflower/broccoli, strawberries, and coffee 
have all lost U.S. import shares to Central American and Caribbean exporters. 
 
 
Mexican Export Market Diversification: The Competitiveness of Mexican  
Agricultural and Food Exports in Canada, the European Union, and Japan 
 
 
While the U.S market absorbs 86% of the total value of Mexican agricultural and food exports, 
Mexico has been attempting to diversify its export market base since the implementation of 
NAFTA as a means of gaining competitiveness and reducing dependence on U.S. markets. As  
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indicated earlier, the European Union is the only major market for Mexican agricultural products 
besides the United States.  Despite signing a free trade agreement with the EU in 2000, however, 
Mexico continues to lose its overall share of EU agricultural and food imports.  Mexican 
agricultural and food exports to Canada are growing but from an extremely small base. 
 
According to Eurostat data, major Mexican agricultural and food exports to the EU include 
vegetables and fruits, coffee, beer, and legumes.  Mexican beer is the star performer on a market 
share basis, reaching nearly 30% of the EU-15 imports of beer in 2000-2002 (Figure 13).  Only 
two other groups of Mexican products (dried legumes and avocados/mangoes) have achieved 
more than 5% of EU-15 imports of those products since 1995.  The Mexican export share of EU 
dried legume exports has hovered between 5% and 10% since 1995 with a slight downward trend 
since 2001.  Whether the decline in the Mexican share of EU dried legume imports represents a 
long-term downward trend is not yet clear. The Mexican share of EU avocado/mango imports, 
on the other hand, has exhibited a consistent downward trend from 8% in 1995 to 4% in 2004. 
The Mexican shares of EU imports of grapes, citrus, onions, and coffee have generally been in 
decline since at least 1999.  Mexican shares of EU agricultural and food product imports have 
been lost primarily to Middle Eastern and African countries with which the EU has preferential 
trade arrangements. 
 
Only about 4% of the total value of Mexican agricultural and food exports is directed to the EU 
despite the EU-Mexico free trade agreement signed in 2000.  A substantial penetration of EU 
markets by Mexico will be difficult to achieve over time primarily due to transport distances and 
fierce competition from Eastern European, African, Middle Eastern, and even South American 
countries.  The main opportunity for export growth to the EU for the Mexican agricultural and 
food sector will likely continue to be beer. 
 
According to official Canadian data, fresh vegetables, fresh fruit, and beer currently represent 
45%, 25%, and 20% of the total value of Canadian imports of each respective group of products.  
Mexican avocados have demonstrated a spectacular performance in the Canadian market with 
the Mexican share of Canadian avocado imports increasing from 6% in 1989 to 95% in 2004 
(Figure 14).  The Mexican share of Canadian beer imports also increased rapidly from 7% in 
1989 to 25% in 1999 but since has declined to just under 23% in 2004.  The Mexican share of 
Canadian guava and mango imports also rocketed from 40% in 1989 to 78% in 1997 but dropped 
substantially to 54% by 2004 under pressure from South American exporters.  Mexican tomato 
exports to Canada staged a dramatic comeback beginning in 2000 after losing ground to the 
United States in the 1990s following the implementation of the U.S-Canada Free Trade 
Agreement (CUSTA). Mexican tomato exports accounted for 30% of Canadian imports in 2004 
after dropping from 24% to 3% between 1990 and 1992.  Mexican peppers experienced a similar 
export performance and recovery in Canadian markets and currently account for 25% of 
Canadian pepper imports.  The Mexican share of Canadian grape imports is about 10% while 
that of bananas, coffee, and melons have decline almost continuously since 1989. 
 
Mexico has also attempted to expand its food exports to the profitable Japanese market with 
relative success.  According to COMTRADE data, Japanese imports of food and live animals 
(SITC rev 3, group 0) from Mexico grew from US $ 185 in 1994 to US$ 485 million in 2004, 
achieving a 1.1% share of total Japanese imports of that category. At the subgroup level, the  
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Mexican share of Japanese imports of fruits and vegetables (STIC rev 3, group 05) grew slightly 
from 2% in 1994 to 2.3% in 2004 while the Mexican share of Japanese imports of meat (mainly 
pork) increased from a low of 0.4% in 1994 to 2.7% in 2002 only to decline again slowly to 
2.1% by 2004. The value of Mexican pork exports to Japan grew consistently from US$ 25 
million in 1994 to US $ 204 million in 2001 but afterward declined to US$ 182 million by 2004.  
Not surprisingly, alcoholic beverages (SITC rev 3 group 112) is the only other category in which 
Mexico has gained a noticeable share of Japanese imports.  The Mexican share of Japanese 
alcoholic beverage imports grew from 6.4% in 1994 to 8.3% in 2004 although total Japanese 
imports declined slightly over that period. 
 
 
Main Factors Affecting the Long-Run Competitiveness of Mexican Agriculture 
 
 
Over the last two decades, the growth and competitiveness of Mexican agriculture have been 
determined by a few key factors, including the unilateral liberalization of Mexican markets, the 
implementation of NAFTA, fluctuations in the value of the Mexican Peso, and internal economic 
reforms including changes in domestic agricultural policy.  In the future, however, the marginal 
effects of the factors that have impacted Mexican agriculture in the past will diminish relative to 
the likely effects of a host of other factors that are already beginning to set the direction and 
shape the pattern of those exports.  Among the factors most likely to impact the long-run 
competitiveness of Mexican agriculture include: (1) the growing number of bilateral trade 
agreements between Mexico and its trade partners; (2) food safety and sanitary/phytosanitary 
issues; (3) limitations imposed by the distribution and availability of water in Mexico; (4) 
changes in Mexican agriculture-related infrastructure; (5) Mexican land reform, land tenure laws, 
and the implications for Mexican farm size and productivity; (6)  technology adoption and the 
implications for Mexican agricultural productivity; (7) growth in Mexican per capita incomes 
and domestic demand; (8) structural change in the Mexican food distribution system; (9) changes 
in domestic agricultural and trade policies; and (10) several other potentially important factors. 
 
 
Mexican Free Trade Agreements 
 
 
Following the successful negotiation of NAFTA, Mexico embarked on a global strategy of 
expanding exports by diversifying its set of export customers through aggressive negotiation of 
numerous bilateral free trade agreements.  Since the implementation of NAFTA, Mexico has 
effected 12 FTAs including agreements with Bolivia (1995); Costa Rica (1995); Colombia and 
Venezuela (G-3, 1995); Nicaragua (1998); Chile (1999); Israel (2000); the European Union 
(2000); Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland (EFTA, 2001); Guatemala, Honduras, 
and El Salvador (North Triangle, 2001), Uruguay (2003); and Japan (2005). 
 
According to Luis Ernesto Derbez (2002), formerly the Mexican Secretary of Economy and 
currently the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs: “Mexico's FTAs are a vital component of its 
economic strategy to improve global competitiveness and ensure long-term growth.”   
Nevertheless, a common perception in the Mexican agriculture sector is that such agreements  
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have primarily enhanced the competitiveness of Mexico’s trading partners in Mexico and 
reduced the competitiveness of Mexican agriculture.   For example, U.S. agricultural exports to 
Mexico have increased rapidly since the implementation of NAFTA generating a negative 
Mexican agricultural balance of trade as opposed to the positive balance of trade with the U.S. 
enjoyed by Mexico in non-agricultural goods. 
 
Williams (2001) argues, however, that NAFTA has had little direct effect on U.S. agricultural 
and food exports to Mexico.  The primary impacts of NAFTA, he contends, have been to 
stimulate an increase in Mexican agricultural exports to the United States and to lock in trade 
gains achieved as a result of the decade long process of unilateral liberalization of Mexican 
agricultural and food trade.  He concludes that changes in the composition of U.S. exports to 
Mexico to include a larger share of higher value food products and an increase in capital 
investments and joint ventures by U.S. firms in Mexican agricultural and food industries have 
been more related to economic growth in Mexico and changes in Mexican investment laws than 
to the specific provisions of NAFTA.  He conducts a trend and structural change analysis of 
U.S.-Mexico agricultural trade and finds no significant change in the trend growth in the value of 
U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico before and after NAFTA.  The implication is that U.S. 
agricultural exports to Mexico in the post-NAFTA years are following a trend established during 
the decade prior to NAFTA as Mexico unilaterally liberalized its trade.  On the other, hand, he 
finds that NAFTA increased both the level and the rate of growth in Mexican agricultural and 
food exports to the United States.  This result makes sense, of course, because while Mexico had 
already eliminated most of its trade barriers over the decade prior to NAFTA, the U.S. only 
began eliminating its existing barriers to Mexican imports with the implementation of NAFTA. 
 
By maintaining more open borders among all three countries, NAFTA will also insure greater 
direct interaction and response of the agricultural markets in each country to changes in market 
and economic conditions in any of the other member countries.  As a result, the pattern, 
composition, and growth in U.S. agricultural trade with its NAFTA partners will be increasingly 
determined by the underlying comparative advantage in each country as affected by a broad 
range of forces external to those markets, many of which may be more important to future U.S. 
agricultural trade with Canada and Mexico than the provisions of NAFTA. 
 
Little research has yet been done on the effects of the other Mexican FTAs on Mexican 
agricultural trade. In general, however, the effects would likely be similar to those of NAFTA 
although much smaller in magnitude.  In essence, through its efforts to establish FTAs with its 
current and potential trading partners, Mexico is seeking trade reciprocity.  In other words, 
having unilaterally opened its own markets to the benefit of other countries,  Mexico is intending 
to benefit from negotiating greater access to international markets.  This report provides little 
evidence that Mexico has made any particular headway in diversifying and developing its 
agricultural export markets through the many FTAs that it has negotiated.  Nevertheless, the 
potential remains and could help provide some cushion for Mexico against recently declining 




Food Safety and Sanitary/Phytosanitary Issues 
 
 
As bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade negotiations remove conventional barriers to trade 
among countries like tariffs and quotas, globalization is rapidly linking the economies of trading 
countries and internationalizing what were once only domestic issues such as food safety (FS) 
concerns and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) problems.  Appropriate strategies to prevent or 
mitigate the impacts of SPS and FS problems are now key components of most countries’ 
domestic policies and have potentially important effects on trade.  In the U.S., for example, 
despite having one of the safest food distribution systems in the world, outbreaks of foodborne 
illnesses over the last decade have induced increasing concerns about food safety which have 
been compounded since September 11, 2001 and subsequent bioterrorism scares. The sensitivity 
of U.S. markets to FS concerns has been heightened over the last 10 years by the strong increase 
in the U.S. per capita consumption of fresh produce and the growing import component of that 
consumption (almost 20% in fresh fruits other than bananas and 14% in fresh vegetables). 
 
Because Mexico is the largest supplier of fresh produce to the U.S. market, concerns about food 
safety related to fruits and vegetables naturally focus on imported Mexican produce. While there 
is little evidence that imports are more likely to involve FS problems than domestic U.S. 
production, media reports related to potential foodborne illnesses such as the Alar scare of the 
early 1990s have helped create a consumer perception that such is the case.   When outbreaks of 
foodborne illnesses are traced back to foreign food producers, not only do those producers feel 
the market effects but also importers, shippers, wholesalers, processors, and retailers all the way 
along the supply chain from the foreign producers to U.S. consumers. The consequence has been 
increasing sensitivity to and reporting of even minor FS problems related to imported food 
products. 
 
The case of trade-related SPS issues is somewhat different than that of food safety issues but no 
less important. The main SPS problems have long been identified and are related primarily to the 
potential for imported animal and plant pests or diseases that can affect U.S. domestic 
production. The most challenging phytosanitary issue related to U.S.-Mexico trade has been the 
fruit fly which has been under control in the U.S. but not in most Latin American countries. In 
the case of animal sanitary issues, tuberculosis, brucellosis, and foot and mouth disease have 
been the main targets but recent serious problems include bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
(BSE), more popularly known as mad cow disease, and avian influenza. 
 
The responsibility for U.S. food safety issues related to imported food belongs to the USDA 
Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The former covers meat, poultry, and eggs 
while FDA deals with all other products including fresh fruits and vegetables. When an FS 
outbreak is detected, the problem is traced back to specific producers.  If repeated cases are 
found, entire regions and even a whole exporting country can be affected through import 
prohibitions that can be highly costly.  The responsibility for plant and animal health issues 
related to imports is the purview of the U.S. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
(APHIS) in the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
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In Mexico, SENASICA is the government agency responsible for both FS and SPS programs. 
SENASICA coordinates with FDA, FSIS, and APHIS whenever an FS or SPS problem arises 
with Mexican agricultural or food exports to the U.S.  A recent evaluation of SENASICA by the 
Inter-American Institute for Cooperation in Agriculture (IICA) concluded that the agency’s 
budget as a percent of national GDP is quite low compared to the budgets of similar agencies in 
other countries like Argentina, New Zealand, and Australia (IICA 2004).  The IICA report also 
concluded that SENASICA lacks personnel with solid expertise in critical areas of operation, has 
a weak and ineffective system of interaction with the private sector, and is in need of an 
improved system of traceability related to animal health issues. 
 
Food Safety Issues Related to Mexican Food Exports to the U.S.  
 
In general, Mexican producers and shippers attempt to follow U.S. SPS and FS regulations 
closely to keep U.S. import channels open and their products flowing to U.S. markets.   The 
general feeling among Mexican produce exporters persists that their products are subject to 
stricter controls and more inspections than equivalent domestic U.S. produce.  Nevertheless, only 
three major cases of food safety problems involving U.S. food imports from Mexico have been 
reported since the implementation of NAFTA in the mid 1990s: (1) strawberries, (2) cantaloupes, 
and (3) green onions. All three cases have caused substantial losses not only to Mexican 
exporters but also to U.S. shippers and producers. 
    
Strawberries 
 
In March 1997, an outbreak of hepatitis A was reported in Michigan and later in other states. 
(Hutin et al. 1999). The cause was rapidly traced back to frozen strawberries from a firm in 
California that used Mexican strawberries.  Although most Mexican strawberries are sold in the 
fresh market, a small portion is sold for processing.  The FDA determined that the source of the 
contamination was not California strawberries but failed to determine if the Mexican 
strawberries were contaminated in Mexico or at the processor in California. The public concern 
affected all berries leading to a 40% drop in monthly grower prices between March to April 1997 
and a 47% drop in Mexican strawberry exports to the U.S. that year.  The cost to U.S. strawberry 
producers has been estimated in the range of $15 to $40 million (Richards and Patterson 1999). 
The FDA subsequently provided training in GAP (Good Agricultural Practices) to California 
strawberry processors.  Mexican agricultural agencies also disseminated information about 
FDA’s GAP program among Mexican growers (Calvin 2003).  By the following year (1998), 
Mexican strawberry exports had recovered somewhat.  By 1999, U.S consumer and shipper 
confidence in Mexican strawberries rebounded pushing Mexican exports of strawberries to 





The case of Mexican cantaloupe exports was different and more serious than that of strawberries. 
Contamination with salmonella was detected in the three consecutive years of 2000, 2001, and 
2002.  In all cases, the contamination was traced back to a single region of Southern Mexico. The 
spring 2000 outbreak of Salmonella Poona was found to be caused by imported Mexican  
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cantaloupes and traced back to a single producer in Southern Mexico and to a shipper in Arizona 
(Anderson et al. 2002). The FDA issued import alerts for the both the shipper and producer. 
Because the Mexican export season was at an end at the time the salmonella problem was 
reported, the economic impact that year was not too serious for Mexico.  U.S.-produced 
cantaloupes and imports from Central America bore the brunt of the market reaction to the 
report. 
 
In the spring of 2001, another two cases of salmonella outbreaks associated with cantaloupes 
were reported (Salmonella poona and salmonella anatum). The FDA traced the source of 
contamination to the same grower in Mexico and the same shipper in Arizona implicated in the 
previous year’s outbreak. The FDA requested cantaloupes from those firms to be removed from 
sales in the U.S. and again issued an import alert for the grower and shipper. Later that year, 
SENASICA, the Mexican agency in charge of food safety issues, launched a program intended to 
eliminate the food safety hazards for cantaloupes. The program included planting permits, a GAP 
program and a Good Management Practices (GMP) program for growers and packing houses 
along with sophisticated traceback capabilities. The program was implemented on a voluntary 
basis in some Mexican states. In the following year, the FDA and SENASICA launched a joint 
training program for government inspectors and cantaloupe growers (Calvin 2002). 
 
Despite the many efforts to eliminate the problem, an additional outbreak of Salmonella Poona 
was reported in the U.S. and in Canada in May 2002.  Again, the problem was traced back to 
imported cantaloupes from Mexico.  This time, however, the cantaloupes were shipped through 
McAllen, Texas (Anderson et al., 2002) from two states in Mexico (Michoacan and Guerrero).  
The FDA subsequently issued an import alert for all cantaloupe imports from Mexico based on 
the concern that produce from restricted regions could be mingled with those from non-restricted 
areas. In November of that year, Canada also issued an import alert for all Mexican cantaloupes 
(CFIA, 2002). The economic impact from this third outbreak was widespread in Mexico. The 
Mexican states of Sonora, Jalisco, Colima, and Tamaulipas were about to begin or at the peak of 
their respective harvesting seasons when prices began to tumble and exports dropped 
precipitously.  The FDA announced that individual Mexican producers could petition to be 
removed from the import alert if they provided sufficient documentation regarding their food 
safety practices. U.S. imports of Mexican melons declined by $40-45 million in 2002 and 2003 
from pre-outbreak levels.  U.S. imports of Mexican cantaloupes rebounded in 2004 and 2005 
back to the 2000-2001 average. Although no official estimates of the economic impact of the 
salmonella outbreak on the Mexican cantaloupe industry are available, assuming the drop in 
Mexican exports in 2002 and 2003 was mainly due to the salmonella outbreak, the overall cost 




In November of 2003, FDA announced that an outbreak of hepatitis A in Tennessee had been 
traced back to undercooked green onions imported from Mexico (FDA 2003).  Later FDA 
announced that the source of contamination was four specific firms that grow green onions in 
Mexico and issued an import alert ordering border inspectors to reject shipments from those 
firms (Calvin, Avendaño, and Schwentesius 2004). 
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The hepatitis A virus causes a liver disease that occasionally can be severe and is mainly 
transmitted by the fecal-oral route.  Contaminated green onions have been associated with 
previous illness outbreaks in the U.S. (including domestic production). They are susceptible to 
contamination because the plant surfaces are particularly adherent to fecal particles (Dato et al 
2003).  Mexico supplies most of the U.S demand for green onions (87% in 2003) primarily from 
the states of Baja California and Sonora.  The harvesting and packing of green onions are both 
highly labor-intensive because they are bunched by hand so that the likelihood of microbial 
contamination is high. In a typical operation, up to nine persons might handle a green onion 
(Calvin, Avendaño, and Schwentesius 2004). 
 
In recent years, Mexican growers of green onions have adopted strong and expensive food safety 
programs to comply with the U.S. GAP and GMP guidelines (Avendaño and Schwentesius 
2003).  Although Mexican officials inspected the firms identified by FDA as the source of the 
contamination and claimed that no evidence of contamination was found, the damage caused to 
the Mexican green onion industry by the FDA alert was severe.  In the two weeks after the FDA 
announced that the source of the illness outbreak had been traced to Mexican green onions, the 
price per box dropped from $18.30 to $7.23 while shipments to the U.S. declined 42%. The loss 
just to Mexican growers was estimated to be about $10 million (Calvin, Avendaño, and 
Schwentesius 2004). 
 
As the major U.S. supplier of many fresh fruits and vegetables, Mexico will be prone to suffer 
economic losses if strong FS programs are not developed and enforced.  Just one case of a food-
related illness can cause serious damage to the reputation of producers in both contaminated and 
non-contaminated areas or products.  Take the case of Guatemala in 1996 when foodborne 
illness outbreaks were associated with raspberries imported from that country.  At the time, 
Guatemala was the largest exporter of raspberries to the United States.  The FDA issued 
successive import alerts that devastated the Guatemalan raspberry industry from which it has 
never fully recovered despite having implemented new FS programs.  With better FS programs 
in place at the time of the outbreak, Mexican growers have been able to capture and hold onto 
much of the Guatemalan share of U.S. raspberry imports. 
 
Sanitary/Phytosanitary Issues Related to Mexican Food Exports to the U.S.  
 
SPS problems refer to sanitary issues associated specifically with plant and animal health. 
Mexican exporters to the U.S. have learned from long experience to comply strictly with U.S. 
SPS standards as the only way maintain their share of U.S. markets. Two major plant health 
issues related to Mexican exports concern avocados and citrus.  The situation is more 
complicated in the animal health area with new diseases like BSE and avian influenza which are 
imposing severe restrictions on trade in many countries but currently are not affecting Mexican 




Avocado exports from Mexico were banned in 1914 due to concerns over avocado weevils and 
fruit flies (Orden, 2002; Pacheco 2004).  Over the following decades, the Mexican government, 
pushed by Mexican avocado producers, lobbied the U.S. Department of Agriculture for access to  
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U.S. markets to no avail.  In the early 1990s, a plan filed with the U.S. by the Mexican 
government to grow avocados for export in the state of Michoacan, Mexico’s principal avocado 
producing state, under strict conditions, including complying with U.S. phytosanitary rules, 
restricting the exports to specific months, and only selling the avocados in specific U.S. states 
met with little response.  Although the NAFTA negotiations pushed the avocado controversy to 
the forefront, avocados were eventually excluded from the agreement.  In 1995, APHIS proposed 
a rule to allow imports of Mexican avocados under certain specific conditions. APHIS concluded 
that although Mexican avocados are susceptible to some pests, the likelihood of pest introduction 
to the U.S. is extremely low if strict phytosanitary procedures and standards are followed 
(Bredahl et al, 2001).  In 1997, the U.S. government ruled that Mexican avocados could be sold 
in 19 states, located in cooler climates and far away from the U.S.-Mexico border. Avocado 
imports were limited to only four months out of the year. Four years later, 12 more states were 
put on the list, and the window of importation was stretched to six months.  As NAFTA began 
opening markets between the U.S. and Mexico, U.S. firms began establishing growing and 
packing operations in the large avocado producing states of Michoacan and Sinaloa (Pacheco 
2004). U.S. firms began to ship avocados from Mexico back into the U.S. just as the U.S. 
government started allowing in Mexican imports.  In November 2004, the USDA issued a ruling 
to allow Mexican-grown avocados to be sold year-round in 47 states (excluding the avocado 
producing state of California, Florida, and Hawaii) starting on January 31, 2005.  The USDA 
based its decision on findings that the avocado pests from Mexico are no longer a major threat. 
 
Following the 1997 decision to open U.S. markets to increased imports of Mexican avocados, 
Mexican exports doubled from about 5,000 metric tons (mt) to 10,000 mt.  By 2001, exports had 
jumped to 25,000 mt and then soared to 75,000 mt in 2003 and 130,000 mt in 2005 from an 
increasing number of municipalities to an increasing number of U.S. states through extended 
export windows.  The value of Mexican avocado exports to the U.S. passed the $200 million 
mark in 2005 and the volume is expected to grow an additional 9% by 2007 but with a 12% 
decline in price (Zahniser et al. 2005).  By that time, Mexico will have captured an estimated one 
third of U.S. avocado consumption and may need to consider restraining exports to avoid 
oversupply problems in the U.S. avocado market.  This is an obvious case where relieving an 
SPS constraint has had a substantial impact on Mexican export competitiveness.  
 
Citrus and Other Commodities 
 
The only other major concern related to Mexican exports and plant health issues involves 
Mexican citrus exports and infestations of fruit flies.  In Mexico, the Mexican fruit fly is a major 
pest of mangos, grapefruits, tangerines, and oranges but also attacks apples, apricots, avocados, 
nectarines, peaches, pears, plums, and prunes as well as other fruits. Certain areas of Mexico are 
not generally infested but experience sporadic outbreaks (APHIS 1993).  When outbreaks of fruit 
flies occur in Mexico, the U.S. quarantines those areas.  APHIS and the Mexican government 
cooperate in a program to suppress Mexican fruit flies and prevent their spread. Activities 
include monitoring traps, releasing sterile flies, checking fruit at road stations, treating fruit 
imports, and regulating fruit shipments from quarantined areas. The northeast regions of Mexico 
have been declared fruit fly free zones but at times lose that designation when fruit flies are 
detected in the area.  Mexican citrus producers are currently pushing for USDA recognition of 
northern Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon as low prevalence fruit-fly areas. This will enable orange  
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exports from those areas to have market access to certain U.S. states. Currently, Nuevo Leon 
exports treated citrus to the U.S. under a pre-clearance program. 
 
Sanitary issues related to livestock have likewise limited exports from Mexico.  For example, 
Mexico historically has been unable to export poultry products to the United States because of 
problems with Exotic New Castle Disease (END) in some regions of Mexico.  Mexico has 
contended, however, that not all Mexican states have END and have petitioned the U.S. to 
recognize those areas as END-free zones and allow imports of poultry from those areas.  In 1997, 
APHIS amended its regulations to recognize disease-free regions or zones within a country. 
After evaluating the Mexican states of Sonora and Sinaloa under the new regulations, USDA 
determined that the risk from END transmission from those regions was relatively low (Salin, 
Hahn, and Harvey 2002).  The rules subsequently issued to allow poultry imports from Mexico, 
however, are specific and confine the rearing of birds destined for the United States, as well as 
their slaughter, to Sinaloa and Sonora. If those regions comply with APHIS restrictions and 
Mexico becomes eligible to export fresh poultry to the United States, Mexican processors in 
these two states will be able to export fresh, chilled, and frozen poultry meat to the United States 
for the first time.  Mexico has also requested that USDA consider additional states to be declared 
low risk for transmitting END.  Although the U.S. is currently a net exporter of chicken to 
Mexico, Salin, Hahn, and Harvey (2002) suggest that changes in the eligibility of Mexico poultry 
exports to enter U.S. markets could result in highly different poultry trade patterns between the 
United States and Mexico in the future. 
 
According to Hahn et al. (2005) sanitary barriers related to potentially high-impact animal 
diseases, such as Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), bovine tuberculosis and 
brucellosis, Classical Swine Fever (CSF), Exotic Newcastle Disease (END), and Avian Influenza 
(AI) are now the major factors limiting further integration of the North American livestock and 
meat products industries.  Restrictions at the U.S. border with Mexico require that cattle must be 
certified free of brucellosis and tuberculosis. Most Mexican feeder cattle destined for the U.S. 
market are steers.  A requirement that heifers be spayed keeps their numbers relatively low. 
Cattle must be free of ticks and are dipped in insecticide baths.  Hahn et al. (2005) cite studies 
concluding that the typical basis for refused entry of Mexican cattle into the U.S. is failure to 
comply with regulations, such as ear tags and records that are not consistent, dipping certificates 
that are not in order, improper branding, evidence of open wounds (such as from recent 
castration) or live ticks, or suspicions that the cattle in question may have been stolen in Mexico. 
Before entering the United States, cattle are given a bill of health by the veterinarian-in-charge 
and are then transported to their destination pasture or feedlot by truck. 
 
In pork trade, U.S. regulations concerning Classical Swine Fever (CSF) effectively prevent U.S. 
imports of live hogs and fresh, chilled, or frozen pork from most parts of Mexico.  Since 1995, 
the Mexican Government has worked to secure the regionalization of U.S. restrictions 
concerning CSF (Hahn et al. 2005). USDA first recognized the Mexican States of Baja 
California, Baja California Sur, Chihuahua, and Sinaloa as being free of CSF and then extended 
similar recognition to the Mexican states of Campeche, Quintana Roo, Sonora, and Yucatán in 
March of 2005.  Even so, Mexican pork exports to the United States remain negligible. Mexico 
is becoming a supplier of pork to Japan, however, competing with both the United States and 





Although Mexico has abundant water supplies, the distribution of water in Mexico is a major 
problem limiting potential growth in Mexican agricultural production and exports.  About 20% 
of the water in Mexico is located where 75% of the population resides and where 80% of the 
industrial activity takes place. Agriculture is the largest user of water in Mexico, accounting for 
83% of the total water consumed.  Because of the maldistribution of the water supply, however, 
only 6.1 million hectares or 24.4% of the agricultural land in Mexico is irrigated (INEGI).  At the 
same time, inefficient irrigation practices result in a 65% loss of irrigation water and poor crop 
productivity levels due to the flooding of crops, land salinity, and erosion. 
 
Mexico's groundwater aquifers are also being severely depleted.  The aquifers that support 
agriculture in the Comarca Lagunera, a major cotton and dairy production area of Mexico, for 
example, are being depleted at rates between 2 and 7 meters per year.  The depletion of these 
aquifers not only has resulted in increased pumping costs to Mexican agricultural producers but 
also has led to the presence of arsenic in the water due to the geological configuration of the 
region (World Bank 1999).  The recharge rate of the aquifers which support the Valle de Santo 
Domingo in the state of Baja California is below 50%.  Also, the aquifers in the Valle de León, 
Río Turbio, and Silao in the state of Guanajuato are being depleted at rates of 1, 2.5, and 3 
meters per year, respectively.  These depletion rates have also led to the intrusion of salt water  
rendering the groundwater unfit for agriculture or human consumption (World Bank 1999). 
 
The agricultural use of water containing effluents or industrial residuals in Mexico is also 
problematic and is creating severe soil degradation and crop contamination problems (World 
Bank 1999).  This is a serious problem given that pathogenic agents and heavy metals such as 
lead, mercury, zinc, and cadmium contained in these waters enter the food chain and cause 
human health problems.  The misuse of pesticides, produced in Mexico or are imported, in 
Mexican agriculture has led to the contamination of groundwater and surface water which has 
negatively impacted aquatic life, wildlife, and human health. 
 
Less than 16% of sewage from Mexico's cities and towns receives any sort of treatment. The rest 
runs directly into waterways. Many towns have wastewater treatment plants which were 
constructed through development programs but have now fallen into disrepair. As a result, the 
water is too contaminated to be used for domestic purposes by downstream communities. 
Instead, farmers often divert untreated wastewater flows to irrigate their fields, exposing both 
farmworkers and consumers to a host of health risks.  
 
As a consequence, the future growth potential of Mexican agriculture is in serious doubt.  Even if 
the huge needed investments to clean up Mexican water supplies were made, the limited 
availability of water in the main production areas of central and northern Mexico will continue to 
limit the expansion of Mexican agricultural production and exports.  The adoption of water-
saving technologies is helping to mitigate the limiting effects of the growing water crisis on 
Mexican agricultural production and export competitiveness.  Nevertheless, such technologies 
are expensive and, thus, tend to further concentrate Mexican agriculture toward areas of large-
scale commercial agriculture.   
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Mexican Agriculture-Related Infrastructure 
 
 
Despite notable improvements since the implementation of NAFTA, the Mexican production, 
transportation, marketing, storage, distribution, and communication infrastructure remains 
underdeveloped relative to those of the U.S. and other developed countries and largely 
insufficient for the growing requirements of the Mexican economy to facilitate the continuing 
transition to more open markets. Despite growing public and private investments, the inefficient 
Mexican infrastructure continues to constrain the growth of the Mexican economy and the global 
competitiveness of the Mexican agricultural sector. 
 
Not all regions of Mexico face the same level of agriculture-related infrastructure problems that 
plague Mexico in general and not all areas of agriculture-related infrastructure are 
underdeveloped to the same degree. For example, tomato producers in the Mexican state of 
Sinaloa have the necessary infrastructure in place, including irrigation, reliable transportation 
from Sinaloa to Nogales on the U.S. border, and dependable U.S. marketing channels, to respond 
to the export incentives of NAFTA.  Nevertheless, in most areas of Mexico, underdeveloped 
infrastructure represents a significant obstacle to efficient operation and growth in agricultural 
production, processing, and marketing. For example, current growth in Mexican fruit and 
vegetable production is placing tremendous pressure on the outdated and inadequate level of 
irrigation water storage and delivery systems in many production areas (World Bank 1999).  
 
Perhaps the major infrastructure restriction to Mexico’s long-run competitiveness in international 
agricultural markets is the Mexican transportation system (Barkema and Drabenstott 1996).   
Even though shipments by truck are more expensive in Mexico than in the United States, truck 
traffic accounts for about 80% of Mexico’s food and agricultural shipments (Barkema and 
Drabenstott 1996). Mexico has built nearly 3,400 miles of four-lane highways between its major 
cities since 1990 but much more is needed particularly to handle the growing truck traffic 
(NATSDB 2005).  Many of the new highways are toll roads so many trucks resort to public 
roads to avoid paying the toll which leads to further deterioration of already poor public 
highways. In the late 1990s, 61% of Mexican roads were in poor condition, 29% in fair 
condition, and only 10% in good condition (Barkema and Drabenstott 1996). 
 
Continuing congestion and delays at U.S. land border crossings with Mexico are a major 
constraint on the flow of agricultural goods from Mexico to the United States.  Major problems 
include “inadequate or dated transportation facilities; inadequate staffing; incomplete, inaccurate 
and delayed paperwork; inefficient inspection procedures; the lack of coordinated infrastructure 
planning; and traffic peaking at particular times of the day” (Klindworth 1998). Needed 
infrastructural improvements at the border include more bridges, access roads and rail lines to 
cross the border as well as additional commercial inspection facilities (Klindworth 1998). 
 
Although shipping by rail is generally a costly alternative in Mexico, improvements to Mexico's 
railways since the Mexican railroad industry was privatized in the mid-1990s have occurred in 
several areas including track and structures; signaling, dispatching, and communications 
systems; car and locomotive fleet modernization; information technology; and car billing, 
inspection and repair (Railway Age 2000).  Nevertheless, the Mexican rail system continues to  
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face many challenges, including a shortage of intermodal facilities throughout Mexico, the 
continuing inability of Mexican tracks in many areas to handle the weight of standard U.S. rail 
cars, requiring smaller cars at higher total cost, and complicated, lengthy, and cumbersome 
customs clearance procedures at U.S. border crossing points.  Major additional investments will 
be needed to continue upgrading Mexico’s tracks and rail equipment. 
 
Maritime shipping to and from Mexico is also costly and inefficient (Barkema and Drabenstott 
1996). Poor Mexican port facilities, especially for accommodating intermodal grain 
transshipments, lengthy delays in unloading and customs clearance, and poorly developed 
overland routes from Mexican ports to inland distribution points are major constraints to growth 
in Mexican agricultural exports and Mexico’s efforts to diversify its global export customer base. 
The Mexican government has made intermodal transportation a priority and is expanding the 
capacity to handle and distribute container shipments.  Although inland intermodal terminals and 
many ports are now privately operated, they are far from being fully automated and 
internationally competitive. Enormous resources will be necessary to provide these terminals 
with the modern automated equipment needed to achieve a high level of efficiency but container 
movement is still too low to justify the large investment required.  
 
 
Mexican Land Reform, Land Tenure Laws, and Farm Size and Productivity 
 
 
Without question, one of the principal factors that will determine the future ability of Mexico to 
compete in international agricultural markets is the extent to which recent changes in Mexican 
land tenure laws impact the productivity of Mexican agriculture.  The basis for the current land 
tenure system, known as the ejido system, was established through the land reform movement of 
the Mexican revolution of 1910-17. 
 
The initial motive for land reform was to restore land to the people from whom it had been taken 
as well as to create and protect small agricultural property holdings.  Between 1856 and 1910, 
the Mexican government had helped the hacendados (land owners) and foreigners to accumulate 
large land holdings by taking land away from the peasants and selling it at bargain prices to 
Spanish nobility, rich Spaniards and foreigners, and others.  By 1910, only 830 hacendados 
owned 97% of the land in Mexico while 410,345 farmers owned the other 3%. At the same time, 
more than 3 million campesinos or peasants (97% of rural households) owned no land at all 
(Zaragoza and Macías 1980). 
 
The process of land expropriation and distribution began in 1915 but massive redistribution of 
land to landless peasants did not begin until the mid-1930s.  The process created a large number 
of small, inefficient farms, known as the ejidos.  Although popular in Mexico among the rural 
poor, the ejido system has been widely blamed for the poor performance of the Mexican 
agricultural sector (Johnson 1998). Many experts have concluded that the ejido system has been 
the principal constraint to growth in the Mexican agricultural sector.  When the ejido system was 
first established, the goal was not economic efficiency but rather social equity. Originally 
intended as a temporary means of dealing with the problem of land tenure, the ejido system 
evolved into a rigid "mechanism for permanent state control of the farmers" (Grennes et al.,  
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1991).  As a consequence, the ejido system introduced tremendous economic inefficiency into 
the Mexican agricultural sector in several ways, including (1) creating a large number of 
extremely small farms, (2) forcing huge tracts of marginal land into production, (3) preventing 
adequate agricultural production and resource adjustments to changing economic signals, and (4) 
severely limiting the access of the majority of Mexican farmers to agricultural credit.   
 
Until recently, Mexican land laws required that the Mexican government provide at least 4 
hectares (about 10 acres) of irrigated land or its equivalent in rainfed land to each landless 
peasant (Grennes, et.al. 1991). Rapid population growth in Mexico has forced the Mexican 
government to shift huge amounts of land into the ejido system in compliance with the land 
tenure laws.  Currently, ejidos account for about 95 million hectares (235 million acres) or about 
49% of the total Mexican land area.  The 3.1 million ejidatarios represent about 70% of all 
Mexican farmers.  The average ejido is only about 9.5 hectares (23.5 acres) but 64% of ejidos 
average less than 5 hectares (12.4 acres).  The majority of the ejidos are worked on an individual 
basis (80%) and the remainder in a collective or semi-collective system (Schulthies and Williams 
1992). 
 
Due to their small size, about 70% of the ejidos operate at a subsistence level in the sense that 
they do not generate enough income to support a family. Ejido families earn only about 40% of 
the minimum wage, forcing many to seek off-farm employment. The consequence is that ejidos 
lack modern technology and are characterized by extremely low output per acre. In the early 
1990s, most ejidos did not have access to tractors (57%) or industrial equipment (90%). Also, 
33% of ejidos lacked electricity, over 50% did not have running water, 80% lacked paved roads, 
and 40% used wood as the main fuel source (Morett 1991).  Little has changed for many ejidos 
in recent years despite extensive economic and political change in Mexico. 
 
The ejido system has also forced huge tracts of highly marginal land into agricultural use. As 
much as 21% of ejido land is not considered arable and only 16% of ejido land is irrigated.  
Because of the subsistence nature of the ejidos, however, over 90% of them produce at least 
some corn, the main crop of 65% of ejidos, and other food crops despite the unsuitability of the 
soils and/or climate in many areas.  Ejidatarios have also faced restrictions on improving 
marginal lands. If the crop acreage limits of the small property owner restriction were exceeded 
by converting pasture to crops, for example, the land was subject to seizure by the government 
(Schulthies and Williams 1992).  Farmers have been reluctant to invest in their land over the 
years for fear of losing both the land and the improvements. A consequence has been a poor 
average yield performance on large a portion of Mexican crop farmland. 
 
Together with the existing agrarian law, the ejido system prevented adequate agricultural 
production and resource adjustments to changing economic signals. The Mexican land tenure 
laws imposed a number of restrictions on the use of ejido land in an attempt to prevent the land 
from again becoming concentrated in the hands of a few large land owners. Among others, the 
restrictions included prohibitions on the selling, renting, or mortgaging of ejido land since the 
land still legally belonged to the Mexican government, the hiring of paid labor to work on ejido 
land, and the conversion of crop land to pasture. At the same time, the small property owner 
provision of the existing agrarian law resulted in rigid resource and output adjustments to market 
signals in Mexican agriculture particularly because ejidos constituted such a large percentage of  
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Mexican agricultural land area. Many of these restrictions were reportedly violated routinely in 
Mexico, limiting but not eliminating the inefficiencies caused by the restrictions (Grennes, et.al 
1991). 
 
The Mexican land tenure system also limited the access of ejidatarios to credit because the law 
prevented them from using their land as collateral for loans.  To finance production each year, 
ejidatarios had to rely on state credit banks which traditionally restricted the availability of 
financing and the range of crops for which state credit was available (Heath 1990).  The 
consequence was a limitation of both the level and diversification of agricultural production in 
Mexico as well as a constraint on the responsiveness of production to market signals (Heath 
1990).  
 
In 1991, Mexican President Salinas de Gortari pushed historic land reform legislation through 
the Mexican Congress in the form of an amendment to Article 27 of the Mexican constitution to 
help eliminate inefficiencies and promote growth in the Mexican agricultural sector. The 
amendment allowed ejjidatarios to receive the title to the lands they occupy and to be able to 
sell, lease, or mortgage their land with some restrictions.  Foreign ownership of Mexican land 
was allowed with some restrictions. Also, the new law eliminated penalties for improving 
marginal lands. Analyses of Article 27 reforms predicted that the legal changes, along with other 
national privatization efforts, would result in the mass sale of ejido lands, create efficient, larger-
scale farms, and heighten poverty in ejido communities (Bartra 1991; Schulthies and Williams 
1992; Collier 1994; Stanford 1994). According to Lewis (2002), however, these predictions have 
not played out over the years.  Although the Mexican government launched an aggressive 
government program of land rights certification and titling (known as PROCEDE) in 1993, a 
majority of studies to date conclude that the anticipated impacts of the legal reforms have yet to 
materialize (Lewis 2002).  
 
Various hypotheses for the failure of the change in Mexican land tenure laws to bring about the 
anticipated large-scale improvement in Mexican agricultural productivity and competitiveness 
have been put forward.  Bresciani (2004), for example, argues that although PROCEDE helped 
ejido land markets to work better, the change in land tenure laws has promoted increased 
participation by ejido households in local agricultural labor markets and non-farm activities and, 
thus, “a diversification of household income sources, thereby leading to more adaptable 
livelihood strategies, and … new channels through which credit constrained households may 
accumulate enough liquidity to finance accumulation of capital and smoothen [sic] the adverse 
effects of income shocks.”  Whatever the reasons, the sweeping changes to Mexican land tenure 
laws as yet have had little of the anticipated impact on Mexican agricultural efficiency and 




Technology and Growth in Mexican Agricultural Productivity 
 
 
In the absence of appropriate labor-using, land-saving technologies, Mexico has historically 
opted for a political solution to the land constraint problem through land reform.  The ejido  
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system was an attempt to allow a more intensive use of labor per unit of land in Mexico.  Efforts 
by the Mexican government over the last decade to reform the land tenure system suggest that 
the lost economies of size and other sacrifices of efficiency from the ejido system have finally 
outweighed the social welfare benefits of the system as perceived, at least, by the government.  If 
the land tenure reform in Mexico is having any lasting impact on farm productivity, investments 
to develop and adapt technologies to promote labor-intensive activities in Mexico will be 
critically needed. 
 
The most highly labor-intensive agricultural activities in Mexico include horticultural crop 
production and processing, livestock raising and processing, dairy production and processing, 
and a large number of various low-level processing activities such as corn milling and tortilla 
manufacturing, bread baking, meat packing, fluid milk bottling, and ice cream manufacturing 
characterized by small, family-controlled businesses.  Mexican corn, bean, and other basic 
commodity sectors are also still highly labor-intensive as well because of Mexican land tenure 
laws and agricultural policies that have encouraged a relatively high labor-to-land ratio in their 
production.  The technologies utilized by a large portion of small and medium-sized Mexican 
agribusiness firms are fairly labor-intensive and typical of those used by the U.S. food processing 
industry 25 years or more ago. 
 
Four problems generally characterize current investments in technology for the Mexican 
agricultural and agribusiness sector.  First, most of the investments are in capital-intensive 
technologies of types developed and in use in developed countries rather than more labor-
intensive types.  The consequence is that the labor intensity of Mexican agricultural and food 
processing industries is likely lower than might otherwise be the case, contributing to the already 
high level of unemployment in Mexico. 
 
The second problem is that inadequate investments in public agricultural research and 
development, irrigation systems, transportation infrastructure, distribution, storage, and 
marketing systems, and agricultural credit and related institutions create serious bottlenecks to 
the full realization of the productive potential of new or adopted technologies.  These bottlenecks 
also reduce the profit potential of additional investments in technology transfer and development.  
At the same time, however, such bottlenecks create increased social pay-off to investment in the 
development of technologies to relieve the cause of the bottlenecks.  For example, the current 
Mexican infrastructure bottleneck resulting from rapid growth in U.S.-Mexico agricultural trade 
implies that the pay-off to investment in transportation and other infrastructure technology is 
increased by investments in modern food processing technology in Mexico.  If investment in 
infrastructure technology is induced by the increase in pay-off, the infrastructure bottleneck will 
be eased and additional employment opportunities will be created for displaced agricultural 
labor. 
 
The third problem created by current investments in agricultural and food processing technology 
in Mexico is a widening income disparity among Mexican farmers and agribusiness operators.  
Small and medium-sized farms and agribusinesses in Mexico often have much less access to new 
technologies than large multinational food corporations because of a lack of investment capital. 
New-technology-based increases in production by the large commercial farms and agribusinesses 
in Mexico lead to a drop in market prices and incomes of small and medium-sized producers.   
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For example, investments in fruit and vegetable processing technology that allow large Mexican 
producers and packers to take advantage of the export opportunities created by NAFTA also put 
small and medium-sized fruit and vegetable processors in Mexico at a competitive disadvantage. 
 
Finally, much of the technology in which domestic and foreign firms are investing is being 
transferred from other countries and adapted for use in Mexico rather than being developed 
within the Mexican public/private research sector.  The U.S. has been the major foreign source of 
new technology development in Mexico, accounting for 56% of all technology patents granted 
by the Mexican government in 2003 (INEGI 2005). Consequently, the increasing trade and 
investment in Mexico may not be creating the basis for the development of a strong 
public/private research and extension system to service the growing needs of small and medium-
sized Mexican agricultural and agribusiness firms. 
 
The percentage of total Mexican public expenditures on science and technology invested in 
agricultural research declined substantially between 1990 and 2003 from 13.4% to 6.9% (INEGI 
2005).   Consequently, although foreign capital is being increasingly invested in technology for 
the development of certain Mexican agricultural and agribusiness activities, increasingly less is 
being done by the public sector to adapt and commercialize that technology for the Mexican 
agricultural industry in general.  Also, only limited research is being done to develop 
technologies to assist small and medium-sized firms to compete in an increasingly international 
Mexican agricultural marketplace. 
 
The declining investment of public funds in agricultural research in Mexico is a major constraint 
to growth, development, and competitiveness in Mexico. Investments in technology development 
and diffusion are critically needed in at least four areas to facilitate development of the Mexican 
agricultural sector, mitigate the structural effects of more open trade, and strengthen Mexico’s 
agricultural export competitiveness: (1) the adaptation and commercialization of technology 
developed in other countries, particularly for small and medium-sized Mexican agricultural and 
agribusiness firms; (2) the development of new technology adapted to the conditions of Mexican 
resource endowments; (3) the training of ejidatarios and agribusiness owners on the purpose and 
use of new technology; and (4) the re-training of displaced agricultural labor. 
 
Without a significant increase in public sector investment in technology research and 
development in Mexico in real terms in these areas, the consequence will likely be little 
technology transfer or development in Mexico beyond that which is needed to support 
investment of specific agribusiness operations in specific locations.  In such cases, the returns to 
those investments in technology either will be largely expropriated by foreign investors or will 
create little new growth and employment in Mexico.  A study by Málaga, Williams, and Fuller 
(2001) concludes that Mexican investments in yield-enhancing technologies relative to such 
investments in the U.S. could have a greater impact on the future level of Mexican exports of 
tomatoes and other fresh vegetables to the United States than the elimination of U.S. vegetable 
import tariffs under NAFTA.  
 
The Mexican tomato industry provides a clear example of what appropriate levels of investments 
in technology could mean for the export competitiveness of the rest of the Mexican agricultural 
sector. In the 2002/03 marketing year, Mexico exported nearly 50% of its fresh tomato  
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production, most of which was produced in Sinaloa and Baja California where the tomato 
production technology differs substantially from the rest of the country.  Most of the field tomato 
producers in those states use modern technology, including drip irrigation, fertigation, plastic 
mulch, planed stakes, and, most importantly, extended shelf-life (ESL) varieties (Plunkett 1996).  
Florida uses essentially the same technology, except ESL varieties grow well in Mexico but not 
in Florida.  Mexican ESL tomatoes are vine ripened and considered by U.S. buyers to be 
qualitatively different from Florida's mature green tomatoes. The primary benefit of the vine-
ripened ESL tomatoes is their bright, red appearance and firmness, a key factor in consumer 
purchasing decisions.  With the advantage of ESL varieties and the use of the same technology 
as its U.S. competitors, Mexico increased its market share of U.S. tomato imports sales in the 
early to mid-1990s. 
 
At the same time in Canada, however, rapid development and adoption of greenhouse 
technology allowed Canadian tomato production and exports to the United States to grow 
dramatically and substantially reduce Mexico’s share of U.S. tomato markets in the late 1990s. 
In response, Mexican tomato producers began adopting the same greenhouse technology.  By 
1995, the Mexican greenhouse tomato industry had overtaken the U.S. industry in area planted to 
greenhouse tomatoes and surpassed the Canadian greenhouse industry in 1999 (Cook and Calvin 
2005). Because Mexican greenhouse yields are lower than those of Canada, total Mexican 
greenhouse tomato production is still lower than Canada’s.  Nevertheless, ongoing investments 
in yield-enhancing technology in Mexican greenhouse tomato production could allow Mexico to 
“eclipse” both Canadian and U.S. greenhouse production soon (Cook and Calvin 2005). 
 
 
Mexican Income Growth and Domestic Demand 
 
 
Growth in Mexican per capita incomes could have a key impact on the ability of Mexico to 
expand its agricultural and food exports.  Mexican real per capita GDP has increased by an 
average annual rate of 1.6% since 1988, hitting a high of 5.0% growth from 1999 to 2000 and 
registering 3.1% growth between 2003 and 2004 after two years of negative growth. The result 
has been growing domestic demand for agricultural and food products in Mexico over the last 
two decades along with a shift in Mexican diets away from staple foods like corn and beans 
toward higher value and more processed foods like fruits and vegetables (Tropp et al. 2002). 
 
Sustained economic growth in Mexico would boost Mexican purchasing power and intensify 
Mexican consumer demand not only for imported agricultural and food products but also for 
products Mexico currently produces and exports northward, like fruits and vegetables.    Because 
the income elasticities of high value foods like fruits and vegetables tend to be fairly high, 
continued growth in Mexican incomes could result in exports accounting for an increasingly 
smaller share of the production of many agricultural and food products that Mexico currently 
exports.  In fact, given the limited land area and water resources available for agricultural 
production in Mexico along with the continuing inefficiencies of the ejido system, infrastructure 
problems, and other restrictions, Mexico could well find it increasingly difficult to fill its own 
food needs as a result of growing consumer incomes much less generate sufficient surpluses to 
meet growing international agricultural and food demand.    
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Structural Change in the Mexican Food Distribution System 
 
 
The Mexican food distribution system is experiencing rapid structural change as traditional open 
air markets and small, specialized food stores are being increasingly replaced by large, efficient 
supermarket chains (Tropp et al. 2002). The growing network of modern supermarket chains in 
Mexico is challenging the capacity of Mexico’s outdated distribution system particularly for 
perishable products like produce, meats, and other products that require refrigeration as they 
move through the system from producers to consumers (Tropp et al. 2002).   In turn, these 
changes are forcing changes in the way the Mexican agriculture and food system interact with 
and impacts international agriculture and food markets.   
 
The growth of supermarkets is forcing improvements in services and modernization throughout 
the Mexican retail grocery sector and is reinforcing the trend toward increased consumption of 
fruits, vegetables, and meats in Mexico by providing consumers access to a greater array of food 
products at lower costs.  An important consequence is that the domestic market is rapidly 
becoming a more important competitor for domestically produced agricultural and food products 
than in the past.   
 
For example, growth in Mexican per capita vegetable consumption, the increased demand for 
quality in Mexico, and the improvement in Mexican food distribution system together have 
generated conditions that appear to be changing the traditional “residual” market characteristic of 
Mexican domestic vegetable markets (Málaga 1997).  During the 1970s, Mexico shipped 20%-
30% of its total tomato production to domestic markets.  In the 2003/04 season, however, about 
55% of Mexico’s fresh tomato production was shipped to Mexican domestic markets (USDAa).   
 
 
Domestic Agricultural and Trade Policies 
 
 
Although NAFTA contains no commitments on changes in domestic farm policies, the more 
open borders among the three countries as a result of NAFTA means that domestic farm policy 
changes particularly in the U.S. and Mexico have the potential for greater impact on the 
agricultural sectors and trade of each member country than was the case before the 
implementation of NAFTA.  Before the 1990s, Mexico supported its agriculture through an 
extensive and complex system of subsidized inputs, guaranteed producer prices, subsidized retail 
food sales, and high import barriers. Beginning in 1991, Mexico began reducing its support to 
the agricultural sector and the direct role of the government in purchasing, storing and 
distributing agricultural commodities. 
 
The implementation of NAFTA in 1994 meant that import barriers could no longer be used as a 
means of farm support.  To help the Mexican farm sector transition to more open markets, 
Mexico adopted the PROCAMPO program in October of 1993 (Williams 2001).  PROCAMPO 
replaced high support prices for crops with decoupled direct payments to producers making 
Mexican farm crop allocation decisions more dependent on relative market prices than 
government policies. PROCAMPO provides direct income support payments based on historical  
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acreage planted to nine eligible crops: corn, beans, wheat, cotton, safflower, soybeans, sorghum, 
rice, and barley. The program was phased in during 1993-1995 and fully implemented in early 
1996.  PROCAMPO payments have been extended over time from covering primarily grains and 
legumes to all commodities.  Total program funding for 2004  was $1.3 billion or $83 per hectare 
($34/acre) for producers with more than five hectares and about $99 per hectare ($40/acre) for 
producers with 1-5 hectares (Zahniser, Young, and Wainio 2005). For fall 2004 and spring 2005 
the payment rate is $83 per hectare for all producers. 
 
Although most experts agree that PROCAMPO has had little impact on the structure of 
agriculture in Mexico (e.g., Rosenzweig 2003), various studies have concluded that the program 
payments have cushioned the effects of economic downturns on Mexican farm income and 
provided liquidity to poor rural households to finance production or invest in human or physical 
capital (de Ferranti et al. 2005; Sadoulet, de Janvry, and Davis 2001).  PROCAMPO reportedly 
has had other income distribution effects on Mexico’s rural economy as well.  For example, 
PROCAMPO has tended to “overcompensate” small farmers and “undercompensate” large, 
commercial farmers for the negative price effects of freer trade because the subsidy has been the 
same per hectare in each year for all farms greater than 5 hectares no matter how large the farm 
and even higher for the smallest farms (de Ferranti et al. 2005).  Nevertheless, because large 
farms account for a larger percentage of agricultural land area than small farms in Mexico, a 
small number of large farms have received the largest proportion of PROCAMPO payments. 
About 45% of small farms (less than 5 hectares) receive only about 10% of total PROCAMPO 
payments (de Ferranti et al. 2005). 
 
PROCAMPO is the largest of the three Mexican “core” programs designed to support Mexican 
farm incomes (Zahniser, Young, and Wainio 2005).  The Mexican federal government also 
provides income support and other benefits primarily to commercial producers through the 
“Program of Direct Supports to the Producer through Marketable Surpluses.”  The key feature of 
this program is a type of deficiency payment or counter cyclical program in which producers 
with “marketable surpluses” of ten specific crops receive income support equal to the difference 
between some per unit income target and the market price.  The Mexican government also 
operates a rural development program designed to enhance the adoption and development of new 
technology in production agriculture primarily through cost-sharing projects with Mexican state 
governments. 
 
Over the last few years, the Mexican government has launched a series of national agricultural 
programs and policies intended to bring Mexican agricultural policy more in the line with 
developed country agricultural policies through evolutionary adjustments in existing programs 
rather than through revolutionary shifts in policy.  In 2002, for example, a comprehensive 
agricultural program known as “Agri-food Armor” was replaced the next year by a new program 
called the “National Agreement on Agriculture” following severe criticism of the 2002 program 
by many producer groups and rural organizations (Zahniser, Young, and Wainio 2005).  The 
National Agreement incorporates the 3 core Mexican income support programs. 
 
Perhaps as important for Mexican competitiveness as its own evolving agricultural policy are 
recent changes in U.S farm policy and their effects on the ability of Mexico to compete in U.S. 
markets.  U.S. agricultural policy changes introduced in the 1996 U.S. farm bill marked a  
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substantial change from previous legislation. The elimination of acreage reduction programs, the 
decoupling of income support from production decisions, and the introduction of nearly full 
planting flexibility considerably increased the market orientation of U.S. agriculture.  A new 
counter cyclical income support program in the 2002 U.S. Farm Act, however, signaled some 
retrenchment from a commitment to reduce government intervention in U.S. agricultural 
markets. In general, recent changes in U.S. farm policy have reduced U.S. farm subsidies and, 
therefore, provide more opportunities for Mexican producers to compete in U.S. markets. 
 
 
Other Potential Limiting Factors 
 
 
Among other specific factors likely to have an impact on the future composition and level of 
Mexican agricultural and food product exports, the following are perhaps the most important: 
 
  Credit Availability - Poor availability of credit continues to plague Mexican agriculture. 
Agricultural loans were hard hit by the 1994-95 peso crisis.  Many private banks now view 
agricultural lending, particularly to smaller producers, as too risky. In 2003, Mexico 
reformed its public lending system, creating Financiera Rural, a public bank with the 
objective of improving the supply of agricultural credit.  
 
  Macroeconomic linkages:  The 1994-95 devaluation of the Mexican Peso also emphasized 
the importance of the macroeconomic linkages between Mexico and its trading partners.   
Freer trade under NAFTA implies that the effects of changes in monetary, fiscal, or exchange 
rate policy by Mexico or the other member countries will be more widely shared among all 
three countries than before NAFTA was implemented (Williams 2001). 
 
  Foreign direct investment: Recent strong growth in foreign direct investments by the U.S. 
and other countries in Mexican productive capacity, technology, and infrastructure are an 
important potential source of growth in employment and incomes in Mexico as well as 
increased efficiencies and competitiveness in world markets. Although much of the foreign 
capital flowing to Mexico in the early years of NAFTA was short-term, highly mobile 
portfolio investments, foreign capital investment in Mexican food production, processing, 
and distribution is growing and transforming the Mexican agricultural and food sector. 
 
  Mexican labor markets and wage rates:  The relatively low cost of Mexican labor provides 
Mexico with a relative advantage in labor-intensive industries like agriculture.  One effect of 
Mexican trade liberalization may be downward pressure on Mexican wage rates as increased 
agricultural imports displace Mexican labor in the import-competing agricultural sector.  The 
consequence could be an increased competitive advantage of Mexican labor-intensive sectors 
like fruits and vegetables and greater pressure for migration of undocumented labor to the 
United States.  Over the longer run, given sufficient economic growth in Mexico to absorb 




  Mexican environmental practices and laws: Over the years, Mexican agricultural and 
livestock practices, such as unwise use of available water supplies, inefficient land use 
practices, poor farm and livestock management practices, overuse of pesticides and 
agricultural chemicals, and overgrazing, have contributed significantly to the degradation of 
the natural resource base of Mexico.  As part of the extensive reforms that began in the mid-
1980s, Mexico enhanced its environmental protection efforts with the passage of the General 
Law on Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection (the General Law) in 1988. This 
wide-ranging law addressed a number of environmental issues such as air, water, and soil 
pollution; management of hazardous waste and materials, pesticides and toxic substances; 
and conservation of wildlife, habitats and natural resources.  Difficulties in monitoring 
pollution and enforcing the General Law, however, have limited the effectiveness of Mexican 
environmental protection efforts and generated severe criticism during the NAFTA 
negotiations. In response, Mexico extensively revised the General Law in December 1996 to 
clarify the powers of the federal government in environmental matters and to emphasize the 
concept of sustainable development as opposed to "rational development" that previously 
was the theme of Mexican environmental laws.  Mexico also has made a significant effort to 
improve the enforcement of those laws and has substantially increased funding for 
enforcement and inspection programs. Even so, continuing environmental degradation and 
problems in enforcing environmental laws continue to limit both Mexican productive 
potential and agricultural export opportunities. Growing awareness among Mexican 
producers that they must manage their use of agricultural chemicals more efficiently and 
effectively to ensure entry of their products through inspection points into U.S. markets, 
however, is prompting Mexican producers to conform their use of agricultural chemicals to 
U.S. standards in the production of commodities planned for export to the United States. 
 
 
Relative Importance of the Mexican Agricultural Export Competitiveness Factors 
 
 
As demonstrated in the previous section, a large number of factors impinge on the 
competitiveness of Mexican agricultural and food exports.  Which likely has the greatest impact 
on Mexico’s ability to compete in export markets?  What is the current and potential impact of 
those factors on the leading Mexican agricultural and food exports?  Most of the factors 
considered do not impact Mexico’s agricultural and food trade directly.  Rather, the trade impact 
in most cases is indirect through the factor’s impact on one or more segments of Mexican 
agricultural and food markets - production, processing, marketing, or consumption.  In the case 
of production, the trade impact of each factor could originate from an initial impact on either the 
efficiency of production or the area under production. Consequently, to determine the relative 
influence of the various factors identified on Mexican agricultural and food exports, the first task 
is to consider the primary segment of Mexican agricultural and food markets that each factor 
impacts and the likely level or intensity of that impact.  Given the factors judged to have 
relatively high potential to impact Mexican agricultural and food markets, the next task is to 
identify the key export competitiveness factors defined as those likely to have a medium to high 
effect on Mexican agricultural and food trade.  Once the key export competitiveness factors are 
determined, the final task is to determine the likely current and future potential impact of those 
factors on the leading Mexican agricultural and food exports.  
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The Primary Market Segment Impacted by the Mexican  
Agricultural and Food Export Competitiveness Factors 
 
 
Among the 15 or so factors identified in the previous section as potential export competitiveness 
factors, a few are likely to have direct impacts on Mexican agricultural and food trade, including 
bilateral trade agreements, food safety, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) issues, infrastructure, 
and linkages with the macroeconomy (Table 2).  Using a scale of high (H), medium (M), and low 
(L) impact, bilateral trade agreements currently have and may be expected to continue to have a 
relatively low impact on Mexican agricultural and food trade with all of that impact the result of 
NAFTA (Table 2). 
 
As discussed earlier, NAFTA is in its final 5-year period during which the trade barriers of the 
most important agricultural and food products traded by the U.S. and Mexico will be eliminated, 
including corn and beans.  Also, Mexico’s attempts to diversify its export markets beyond the 
United States through bilateral trade agreements or through other means were shown to have 
been rather unsuccessful to date.  Thus, once NAFTA has been fully implemented, the likelihood 
of much additional impact on Mexico’s trade from more bilateral trade agreements is quite low. 
 
The earlier discussion also indicated that food safety and SPS issues are likely to have important 
direct impacts on Mexican trade in specific agricultural and food products (Table 2).  At the 
same time, limitations in Mexican transportation infrastructure are likely to continue imposing 
limitations on U.S.-Mexico agricultural and food trade (Table 2).  On the other hand, while 
Mexican foreign exchange policy and other macroeconomic policies and events have the 
potential for serious negative impacts on Mexican agricultural and food trade, the impacts are 
periodic and not likely to have the lasting effects that many of the other factors could have on 
trade.  Málaga, Williams, and Fuller (2001), for example, demonstrate that the 1994-95 peso 
devaluation had a large immediate impact on Mexican agricultural trade that dissipated quickly 
while changes in Mexican production yields and other factors have had a more lasting effect on 
Mexican trade.   
 
The impact of many of the export competitiveness factors identified in the preceding section on 
Mexican agricultural and food trade originates from their impacts on Mexican agricultural 
production (Table 2).  To the extent that these factors constrain production, the ability of Mexico 
to expand exports to meet new opportunities will be limited while the need to allow greater 
imports to meet growing market demand will be enhanced.  Both water issues and land tenure 
problems in Mexico have substantial potential to impact the efficiency and the level of 
agricultural production in Mexico as discussed earlier.  Also, problems regarding current 
investments in technology were identified as having potential to limit the growth in Mexican 
agricultural productivity.   Several other factors are likely to impact the productivity and level of 
Mexican agricultural production, including agricultural policy, agricultural credit, foreign direct 
investment, labor and environmental laws, but at a much lower level (Table 2). 
 
The potential trade impact of a few of the export competitiveness factors identified earlier 
derives from their impacts on either the marketing or consumer segments of Mexican food and 
agricultural markets, including infrastructure problems, income growth, and changes in the  
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Mexican food distribution system (Table 2).  In each case, substantial impact on Mexican 
agricultural and food trade is likely.  In the case of infrastructure, the Mexican transportation 
system is the primary limitation on Mexican trade. To the extent that Mexico achieves lasting 
real income growth, Mexican agricultural and food imports will grow while growth in export 
surpluses will be limited.  At the same time, rapid changes in the Mexican food distribution 
system is enhancing the competitiveness of the domestic market for Mexican-produced 
agricultural and food products and limiting availability of those products for export. 
 
 
The Key Export Competitiveness Factors and Their Effects on Trade 
 
 
Based on the analysis in the previous section, the factors likely to have the greatest impact on  
the Mexican agricultural sector include NAFTA; food safety and SPS issues; water issues; 
infrastructure constraints; land tenure problems; inadequate investments in new technology 
development, dissemination, and adoption; growth in real incomes; rapid changes in the Mexican 
food distribution system; and the availability of agricultural credit (Table 3).  The primary trade 
effect of several of those factors, however, will likely be on Mexican imports rather than exports 
of agricultural and food products. As discussed in the preceding section of this report, NAFTA 
has stimulated an increase in Mexican exports of fruits, vegetables, and beverages to the U.S.  
While NAFTA will likely provide some additional boost to Mexican exports of those products 
over the next few years, the most important effects will likely be on Mexican imports of U.S. 
commodities like corn and beans. 
 
Likewise, if changes in Mexican land tenure laws eventually bring about the expected large-scale 
improvements in Mexican agricultural productivity and competitiveness, the primary impact 
likely would be on Mexican imports rather than exports of agricultural and food products.  In 
large part, land tenure problems affect the non-commercial sector of Mexican agriculture which 
by and large produces commodities like corn and beans that compete with imports.  While some 
of that land could well convert to the production of export crops like fruits and vegetables with 
significant resolution of land tenure issues, persistent problems related to technology, water, 
infrastructure and other issues would continue to limit the ability of those landowners to 
effectively compete in export markets.  For the same reason, resolution of agricultural credit 
availability problems in Mexico would likely affect the production of import-competing crops in 
Mexico to a much greater extent than that of export crops. Also, the sweeping changes taking 
place in the Mexican food distribution system have more to do with imports of agricultural 
commodities and food products than they do with Mexican exports. 
 
Consequently, the key factors likely to impact Mexican agricultural and food export 
competitiveness include food safety and SPS issues; water issues; infrastructure problems; issues 
in technology development and adoption; and income growth (Table 3).  Among those factors, 
the ones likely to have the greatest impact on Mexican export competitiveness over the long-run 
include water and technology issues. Significant progress in relieving constraints on water 
availability and on the investments in technology development, diffusion, and adoption would 
likely have more impact on Mexico’s ability to compete in world export markets than efforts to 
eliminate the constraints imposed by any other factor.  
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Effects of the Key Export Competitiveness Factors on  
Specific Agricultural and Food Products  
 
 
To get a sense of the likely impact of the key export competitiveness factors on Mexican exports 
of specific commodities, the top 24 Mexican agricultural and food exports to the United States 
first were grouped according to the 4 categories identified earlier: (1) commodities 
demonstrating positive growth in both U.S. imports and the Mexican share of those imports; (2) 
commodities demonstrating positive U.S. import growth but negative growth in the Mexican 
share of those imports; (3) commodities demonstrating negative U.S. import growth but positive 
growth in the Mexican share of those  imports; and (4) commodities demonstrating negative 
growth in both U.S. imports and the Mexican share of those imports.  Combining the last two 
groups which include those commodities with the least future export potential for Mexico, the 
specific commodities in each group most affected by the key export competitiveness factors are 
then identified along with an assessment of the levels of the current and likely future impacts of 
each factor (Table 4).   
 
Based on the discussion in previous sections, the commodities most likely to be impacted by 
food safety concerns include green onions (Group 1), strawberries (Group 2), and cantaloupes 
(Groups 3/4). While food safety concerns impact the export of all three commodities, based on 
the discussion in preceding section of the report, eliminating food safety concerns for green 
onions would be most likely to have a positive long-run effect on Mexican export 
competitiveness (Table 4).    
 
While SPS concerns limit Mexican exports of livestock to the United States, given that livestock 
fall into Group 3/4a, large investment in relieving those constraints is unlikely to produce 
substantial export growth opportunities for Mexico (Table 4).  On the other hand, avocados and 
oranges are Mexican commodities whose exports have steadily gained increasing shares of 
growing U.S. imports but have also faced severe SPS constraints in the past.  Investments in 
removing remaining SPS constraints to those products could pay greater dividends in terms of 
export growth than similar investments in removing SPS constraints on livestock exports.   
Nevertheless, the current and future potential impact of the existing SPS constraints on Mexican 
avocado and orange exports is judged to be “low” since much progress has already been 
achieved in removing those constraints. 
 
Again, based on the discussion in previous sections, in terms of the constraints on production and 
export of Mexican agricultural commodities imposed by the availability of water,  vegetable 
crops are the most obvious Mexican export commodities that would benefit from an increase in 
water for irrigation.  Mexican tomato production tends to suffer relatively less from water issues 
since much of the investments in water and irrigation infrastructure in northwest Mexico over the 
years have been made to support the expansion of that industry.  Although many other vegetable 
crops are grown in that area, they tend to be residual claimants for water and would be the 
principal beneficiaries of any investment in water and irrigation infrastructure.  The irrigation 
infrastructure is much less developed in other regions of the country like the northern and central 
Gulf coast areas where vegetable and fruit crops are grown primarily on small and medium-sized 
operations.  Consequently, as indicated in Table 4, the impact of current and future water  
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limitations on production and export competitiveness is estimated to be less severe for tomatoes 
than for other fruits and vegetables. 
 
Although the Mexican melon industry would also benefit from additional water availability, U.S. 
imports of melons have declined over the years along with the Mexican share of U.S. melon 
imports implying relatively little return to investments in relieving water constraints for melon 
production and export to the United States.  The production of most of the commodities in Group 
2 would benefit from additional water for production, including cucumbers, grapes, squash, 
broccoli, strawberries, mangoes, asparagus, eggplant, and cut flowers.  In fact, investments in 
water and irrigation infrastructure could move a number of those commodities from Group 2 
(declining Mexican market shares of growing U.S. imports) to Group 1 (growing Mexican 
market shares of growing U.S. imports). 
 
The conclusions are basically the same for public investments in both transportation 
infrastructure and technology development, dissemination, and adoption.  While additional 
investments in these two areas are and will continue to be needed in the Mexican tomato 
industry, as has been demonstrated clearly by the rapid shift to greenhouse tomato production 
technology in recent years, the other fruit and vegetable industries in Groups 1 and 2 represent 
the greatest opportunities for enhancing Mexican export competitiveness through the adoption of 
new technology. 
 
On the other hand, Mexican export competitiveness across all commodities, particularly those in 
Groups 1 and 2, could be negatively impacted by strong growth in Mexican per capita incomes 
that would create demand for imports in competition with domestic production and compete with 
exports for the available export supply.  This is particularly the case if needed investments in 
new technology, irrigation, and infrastructure are not made, limiting the growth potential of 






Despite growth in the absolute value of Mexican agricultural and food exports since the mid-
1980s, the share of total Mexican exports accounted for by agricultural and food products is 
declining.  A Revealed Comparative Analysis of Mexican agricultural exports confirms that 
Mexico does not have a clear comparative advantage in the production and export of agricultural 
and food products in general. When the RCA analysis is performed at the commodity subgroup 
level, however, the results suggest that Mexico may have a clear comparative advantage in 
vegetables and fruits but not in other major export categories like animals and animal products or 
processed food. While Mexico’s comparative disadvantage in animal products appears to be 
growing, its comparative advantage in vegetables has been eroding over the last decade.   
Mexican fruit exports appear to be maintaining their comparative advantage level while the 
dynamic processed food sector appears to be gaining  comparative advantage as indicated by a 
doubling of their its index since 1995. 
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The U.S market absorbs 86% of all Mexican agricultural and food exports. For most U.S. 
agricultural and food product imports, the level of those imports has been increasing in general 
since the early 1990s at least.  Although growing in absolute value, Mexican vegetable exports to 
the U.S. have been almost continually losing their share of total U.S. vegetable imports despite 
the implementation of NAFTA in 1994. The story for animals and animal products is similar. On 
the other hand, the Mexican share of U.S. fruit imports is growing but at a slower rate than is the 
case for processed foods which doubled their share of U.S. imports of those products since 1995, 
reaching almost 18% of total U.S. imports. 
 
The analysis of the performance of major individual Mexican agricultural and food product 
exports to the U.S. suggests that, with few exceptions, most of those exports have been losing 
market share in growing U.S. import markets, especially in recent years.  These are the 
commodities where investments to increase the levels of productivity and efficiency in 
production, marketing, and transportation and to eliminate institutional, administrative, and 
political barriers to trade would have the highest payoff for Mexico.  The clear exceptions to this 
case are avocados and malt beverages (beer) which continue to experience market share gains in 
continuously growing U.S. import markets. While some Mexican exports like tomatoes and 
peppers have recently shown some capacity to recover from market share erosions, other 
products like non-malt beverages and grapes appear to have allowed early market share gains to 
turn into heavy market share losses in more recent years. Some Mexican exports that have been 
growing in absolute value like asparagus, mangoes, melons, cauliflower/broccoli, eggplants, and 
cucumbers have experienced almost continual market share loses. Not surprisingly, traditional 
Mexican export products like bananas, coffee, and live cattle have been losing share in markets 
where U.S. imports have been declining as well. 
 
In EU and Canadian markets, the consistently competitive Mexican exports have been beer and 
to a lesser extent avocados, tomatoes, peppers, and grapes.  The Mexican shares of EU and 
Canadian imports of most other Mexican agricultural food exports have been declining.  In 
contrast, Mexico’s share of Japanese agricultural and food imports has been increasing over the 
last decade reaching a high of just over 1% in 2004.  Mexico accounts for 2% of Japanese fruit 
and vegetable imports, nearly 3% of Japanese meat imports (mainly pork), and over 8% of 
Japanese alcoholic beverage imports. 
 
In an increasingly global market, the future competitiveness of Mexican agricultural and food 
exports appears to depend on the export potential of those few products for which new 
technologies can be rapidly adopted (tomatoes and peppers), sanitary/phytosanitary barriers can 
be successfully removed (avocados, citrus, grapes, poultry, pork), and clear marketing strategies 
can be developed to take advantage of worldwide trends in consumer preferences for specific 
product characteristics (beer, other beverages, and some processed foods). Most of these latter 
products are associated with the “modern” sector of the Mexican agriculture. The primary 
strategic Mexican export concern will be developing measures to reverse the slow erosion in 
export competitiveness of products for which Mexico traditionally has been thought to have a 
comparative advantage like melons, mangoes, broccoli, cauliflower, cucumbers, eggplant, cattle, 
bananas, and coffee. Many of these products are relatively more associated with small, labor-
intense farms in economically depressed regions of Mexico.  The loss of Mexican export  
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competitiveness in these commodities could well have important social implications for Mexico 
and its neighboring countries.   
 
The rapid evolution of trade liberalization in Mexico’s major food markets (the U.S. and Canada) 
through bilateral and regional trade agreements, and eventually through WTO negotiations, may 
contribute to a further erosion of the relative Mexican competitiveness in those countries in favor 
of new suppliers (particularly Central and South America).  In a highly globalized, competitive 
and evolving food market, just maintaining its share of those two markets, much less achieving 
greater shares, will likely require Mexico to adopt a more aggressive export marketing strategy.  
Particularly needed is an enhanced market intelligence capability to identify emerging 
opportunities quickly, particularly those related to changing consumption preferences, and to 
convey that information all along the supply chain from foreign market consumers back to 
Mexican producers and exporters. 
 
Many factors have the potential to affect the long-run competitiveness of Mexican agricultural 
exports.  For example, sanitary and phytosanitary issues related to Mexican imports receive a 
great deal of media and policy attention. The actual impact of those issues on Mexican export 
competitiveness, however, is likely much smaller than the attention those issues receive.  In 
terms of food safety issues, three products have generated most of the attention since the mid-
1990’s: (1) strawberries, (2) cantaloupes, and (3) green onions. Various strains of salmonella and 
the hepatitis A virus have been traced to imports of these three products from Mexico, leading to 
numerous FDA import alerts over the last decade. Despite efforts of Mexican producers, shippers 
and government agencies to resolve the problems and mitigate the economic effects of outbreaks 
of foodborne illnesses caused by imported Mexican produce, the food safety scares created by 
the outbreaks have caused significant economic damage to Mexican exporters independent of 
their involvement in any particular case of food contamination. Evaluations of the strawberry and 
green onion cases suggest that the cost to the respective Mexican industries has been somewhere 
between $15 million and $40 million for strawberries and about $10 million for green onions.  In 
the case of cantaloupes, the various foodborne disease outbreaks in the U.S. may have caused a 
drop in Mexican export value of between $60 million and $80 million. However, since these 
three products represent less than 3% of the total annual value of Mexican agricultural exports to 
the U.S., the issue of food safety poses a relatively low level threat to the current and future 
competitiveness of Mexican agricultural and food exports. 
 
With respect to SPS problems, Mexico has demonstrated both the desire and ability to resolve 
such issues affecting exports to the U.S.  For example, in a coordinated effort with U.S. 
government agencies, Mexico has effectively opened the U.S. market for avocados. In 2005 
alone, the value of Mexican avocado exports to the U.S. reached $200 million although future 
growth is expected to be slower than in the past few years.  Other more minor opportunities for 
growth of Mexican exports include oranges and some tropical fruits if the fruit fly threat can be 
brought under control. Again, however, avocados and oranges represent around only 2% of the 
value of Mexican agricultural exports to the U.S. An important potential market for Mexican 
grapes in China might depend on a phytosanitary protocol to be signed between the two 
countries. From an animal health perspective, cattle tuberculosis appears to have been the most 
prevalent SPS problem affecting Mexican exports to the U.S.  Swine diseases may also have 
some impact in other markets like Japan. Although at the forefront of all FS and SPS challenges  
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facing Mexican agricultural exports, SENASICA needs a substantial increase in its operating 
budget, technical assistance, and personnel to continue working effectively to maintain and 
expand Mexican export competitiveness. 
 
Four other factors were also considered to pose medium to high limitations to the current and  
future export competitiveness of the top 24 Mexican agricultural and food exports to the U.S.: 
(1) problems in the distribution and availability of water in Mexico; (2) an underdeveloped 
transportation infrastructure; (3) underinvestment in the development, diffusion, and adoption of 
new technology; and (4) the potential growth in Mexican incomes as economic development 
proceeds.  The first three of those factors imply particular limitations for growth of the Mexican 
fruit and vegetable industry, less so perhaps for tomatoes but particularly for other vegetables 
that tend to be residual claimants of water and are more likely to be grown in the eastern and 
central regions of Mexico on small and medium farms.  On the other hand, the growth of income 
in Mexico becomes a limit to Mexico’s ability to export if the consequent growth in domestic 
demand limits the availability of domestic production for export.  This outcome is more likely to 
be the case if the limitations imposed by the other three factors effective prohibit domestic 
supply from expanding sufficiently to meet any domestic growth in demand. 
 
 
Policy Recommendations to Enhance Mexican Export Competitiveness 
 
 
Policy recommendations to boost exports and enhance exports often focus on trade policies that 
limit a country’s access to foreign markets.  Mexico, however, has already tackled the foreign 
market access problem through its aggressive bilateral trade negotiation strategy.  For Mexico, 
then, the most effective strategy to further enhance the competitiveness of its agricultural and 
food exports involves removing internal constraints to taking advantage of the greater foreign 
market access that Mexico has achieved.  While some specific export promotion efforts will need 
to be included in the policy mix, the key general component of any successful strategy to 
enhance the export competitiveness of Mexican agricultural and food products must be a 
substantial increase in public investments in several critical areas, including the expansion of 
irrigation water supplies and delivery systems, transportation infrastructure, and technology 
development, diffusion, and adoption.  Of course, the public investment required to successfully 
relieve these constraints could be enormous.  That does not change the fact that such investments 
are critically needed if any real improvement in export competitiveness is to be achieved. At a 
minimum, a successful strategy to achieve a substantial and sustained expansion of Mexican 
agricultural and food exports will need to  incorporate at least some features of the following 
policy alternatives at some level of investment (in no particular order): 
 
  Targeted export promotion to diversify and expand Mexican export markets 
 
In general, exports of Mexican agricultural and food products to markets other than the 
United States are small and not growing substantially. Consequently, the marginal return to 
increased investments to promote Mexican exports in the EU, Canada, and Japan is likely to 
be quite low.  Nevertheless, a few specific Mexican products have found niches in those 
markets which might be exploited by targeted export promotion efforts intended to develop  
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strong relationships with specific foreign buyers and to brand Mexican products.  Specific 
products that might benefit from such promotion efforts include beer, avocadoes, mangoes, 
guava, peppers, dried legumes, and possibly grapes.  Similar targeted export promotion 
programs could be developed to reverse the downward trend of the Mexican export share of 
growing U.S. imports of specific products, including cucumbers, asparagus, broccoli, squash, 
strawberries, eggplant, and cut flowers.  Such targeted assistance efforts include export credit 
guarantee programs; export incentive programs for specific high priority products and 
markets; market research assistance; product and market-specific export counseling; and 
assistance with documentation and other export requirements. The exporter assistance and 
market development programs of the USDA Foreign Agriculture Service could serve as a 
useful guide in developing such programs (see their website at http://www.fas.usda.gov 
/agx/exporter_assistance.asp). 
 
  Production conversion assistance 
 
Several products are identified in this report as those whose exports are losing shares of 
declining U.S. imports (Group 4), including coffee, sugar, bananas, and melons.  Mexico’s 
export competitiveness could be greatly enhanced through programs designed to encourage 
the conversion of acreage currently devoted to these crops to the production of commodities 
whose shares of growing U.S. imports are also growing (Group 2).  These commodities 
include tomatoes, peppers, avocadoes, onions, pecans, citrus, and other fruits, vegetables.   
 
  Increased public investments in irrigation water storage and delivery systems 
  
The development of additional irrigation water storage and delivery systems is a critical need 
if a substantial increase in the production of export crops is to be achieved. The need is 
particularly critical in the eastern and central regions of Mexico characterized by a large 
number of small farms with limited access to resources to expand production.  The lack of 
water and irrigation facilities could well be the key limiting factor in Mexico’s ability to 
significantly expand its export markets. 
 
  Increased public investments in trade-related transportation infrastructure 
 
  The particular targets of such investments would need to include additional bridges, access 
roads, and rail lines to cross the border; additional commercial inspection facilities; the 
modernization and expansion of Mexican port facilities; updating and expansion of 
intermodal transportation facilities; and improved highways to handle the rapidly growing 
truck traffic.  In addition, significant attention must be given to reducing the time and cost of 
currently lengthy and cumbersome customs clearance procedures at U.S. border crossing 
points. 
 
  Increased public investments in agricultural research 
  
If Mexico is to be able to successfully compete in international markets, the continual 
downward slide in public investments in agricultural research and development must be 
turned around.  Critically needed are investments in research not only to develop new  
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technology to boost agricultural production efficiency and reduce production costs but also to 
adapt technologies available in other countries for use in Mexico.  Particularly needed are 
investments in research to adapt and commercialize technology developed in other countries 
and the development of new technologies adapted to the conditions of Mexican resource 
endowments, particularly for small and medium-sized Mexican agricultural and agribusiness 
firms.  Besides the development of new technology, research is needed on a broad range of 
topics related to economic, animal, and plant systems; business and risk management; 
resource management; and a host of other topics to enhance and support decision-making all 
along the Mexican supply chain. 
 
  An effective system for technology and information diffusion 
 
If needed investments in agricultural research is to provide an effective base for enhancing 
the competitiveness of the Mexican agricultural sector in international markets, an effective 
system for diffusing the research results must be put in place.  Particularly important 
components of that system would be programs for the training of ejidatarios and agribusiness 
owners regarding the purpose and use of new technology and for the re-training of 
agricultural labor displaced by growing agricultural imports. 
 
  An enhanced market intelligence system 
 
The growing openness of world agricultural and agribusiness markets is creating dramatic 
pressure to globalize agricultural and food markets and spawning new ways of doing 
business, new opportunities for growth, new problems to be resolved, and new issues and 
concerns for producers, processors, and many others along the supply chain. Because 
globalization is forcing markets to operate in fundamentally different ways, agricultural 
producers and agribusinesses will need to function in different ways as well.  Globalization is 
forcing marketing and distribution systems to be more tightly aligned with producers being 
raw material suppliers for manufacturers and food processors that will need to be better, 
faster, and cheaper to maintain a sustainable competitive advantage.  As a consequence, to be 
competitive, Mexican producers and agribusinesses will need to be better informed about 
consumer buying habits, preferences, and other purchasing behavior as well as the potential 
effects of myriad domestic and global market forces.  They will require broader and more 
detailed information relating to not only how to produce but also what to produce to meet 
increasingly global consumer demands, how to promote and position their products in the 
global market, how to manage resources to minimize costs and maximize profits, how to 
utilize the new information technology to support informed and efficient decision-making, 
how to analyze and interpret the implications of world events and polices for their business 
operations, how to adjust production, marketing, distribution, and financial operations to 
remain competitive as global markets trends change, and much more.  Unfortunately, in 
Mexico the generation and flow of information needed by agricultural producers and 
agribusinesses is not keeping pace with the growth of globalization. Significant 
improvements in market information systems in Mexico are critically needed to meet the 
rapidly growing information needs of producers and agribusinesses.  Although much has 
been done to enhance the market information available in Mexico, a large segment of 
Mexican agricultural producers and agribusinesses still lack access to critically needed  
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information to manage their risks and make sound production and marketing decisions. The 
highly successful market intelligence system developed by Chile could be used as a model.  
Fundación Chile works with both private and public sector entities to develop and expand 
foreign markets for small scale producers. Highly trained and appropriately compensated 
professionals are the key to the Fundación Chile strategy in which modern marketing and 
supply chain management are critical components.  Another example of advancements in the 
development of information systems to support agricultural decision-making in Latin 
America is the Ecuador Ministry of Agriculture’s Proyecto Servicio de Información y Censo 
Agropecuario (P-SICA) or Agricultural Census and Agricultural Information Service Project 
which could also serve as a model for the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture (SAGARPA) and 
other public and private agricultural information providers in Mexico (see their website at 
http://www.sica.gov.ec/).  
 
  Additional resources to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of SENASICA 
 
Additional resources to support the operations of SENASICA would greatly improve 
Mexico’s effectiveness in responding to food safety (FS) and SPS problems as well as to 
more effectively prevent occurrences through appropriate Training on Good Practices (GAP) 
and other technical support oriented to small and medium-sized farmers and agribusinesses. 
The 2004 report of IICA could serve to guide any necessary institutional changes and the 
allocation of new funds to support SENASICA in dealing with FS and SPS problems 
particularly as they apply to exports. Resources are particularly needed to acquire personnel 
with solid expertise and experience in critical areas of operation; enhance the coordination 
and interaction of SENASICA with private sector entities; and develop an improved system 
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Figure 10 – Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) Index for Four Major Agricultural 
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Figure 12 – Mexican Market Share Change vs. U.S. Import Growth for Major Mexican 
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1989-94 1994-99 1999-04 1989-94 1994-99 1999-04
TOTAL AGRICULTURE 0.3 2.2 0.5 4.3 6.9 7.5
Tomatoes -5.0 -20.7 0.1 8.4 14.9 8.9
Cattle and calves -12.4 -1.3 70.7 11.7 -2.8 -11.5
Peppers -4.4 -4.5 0.2 11.7 11.3 15.1
Cucumbers -0.6 -6.6 -6.3 4.1 5.1 19.7
Grapes, fresh 3.3 21.6 -10.9 3.8 15.3 6.2
Squash -0.2 1.8 -3.1 12.3 8.9 13.0
Cauliflower/Broccoli -5.1 -6.3 -8.4 5.0 7.3 6.6
Coffee -7.2 2.0 -7.9 0.4 3.1 -4.8
Onions -6.7 -9.0 2.3 16.7 0.5 6.1
Pecans -4.4 -1.3 1.9 43.5 5.3 14.8
Citrus, fresh 4.8 -15.0 10.8 30.4 28.9 4.2
Melons -26.9 15.1 -13.6 3.1 14.1 -0.6
Strawberries 17.0 1.9 -9.5 9.2 13.1 5.1
Mangoes -3.7 -14.2 -12.4 18.3 9.0 1.3
Asparagus, fresh -11.5 -4.8 -17.8 19.2 19.8 9.8
Fruit Juices 0.1 0.3 -1.2 -1.9 3.5 1.0
Avocados 3.6 20.7 13.8 41.7 23.7 16.7
Red meat and products 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.8 4.0 11.9
Eggplant 0.0 -3.7 -9.8 15.6 2.0 17.4
Sugar -6.1 5.9 -2.9 0.4 -0.6 -1.7
Cut flowers 0.5 0.9 -2.3 5.9 7.1 3.6
Bananas/plantains 3.7 -2.2 -2.4 4.2 2.3 -1.3
Malt beverages 1.0 16.5 7.8 4.4 12.5 7.9
Other beverages 6.1 16.9 -10.9 11.4 14.8 28.1
--------------------------------------------------- percent ---------------------------------------------
       U.S. Import Growth             Change in Mexican Share of U.S. Imports 
Table 1 – Change in Mexican Share of U.S. Imports and U.S. Import Growth Rate for Top 
24 Agricultural and Food Commodities Exported by Mexico to the United States, 1989-94, 


































Table 2 – Primary Market Segment and Intensity of Impact by the Mexican Agricultural 



















Trade  efficiency area 
Bilateral trade  
agreements           L  








Water issues  H  H   




Infrastructure       H   
  M 
Land tenure  H  H       
   
Technology H   




Income growth          H   
 
Food  distribution       H   









Macro  linkages          L 
FDI L  L  L       




L         
1 H = High impact; M = Medium impact; L = Low impact; and a blank space indicates that the area is not where the primary 
impact of the main competitiveness is felt.  
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NAFTA L  M 
Food Safety  M  L 
SPS issues  M  M 
Water issues  H  L 
Infrastructure M  H 
Land tenure  L  H 
Technology H  H 
Income growth  M  H 




L  M 
 
1 H = High impact; M = Medium impact; and L = Low impact.  
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______________________________________________________________________________________ Group 3/4 
_______________________________________________________________________________________
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All except fruit 
juices & other 
beverages) 
M H  Melons  M H 
Infrastructure Tomatoes 










All H  H 
Technology Tomatoes 






All H  H  All H  H 
Income growth  All  M  H  All  M  H  All  L  L 
 
1 Group 1 includes those products among the top 24 Mexican exports to the U.S. that are experiencing positive U.S. import growth and positive growth in the Mexican share of 
U.S. imports; Group 2 includes those products among the same top 24 Mexican exports to the U.S. experiencing positive U.S. import growth but negative growth in the Mexican 
share of U.S. imports; and Group 3/4 includes all other products among the same top 24 Mexican exports to the U.S.   H = High impact; M = Medium impact; L = Low impact; and 
blank space indicates a small or no impact. 
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